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Abstract 
In this thesis, I use theory and experiments (sometimes only experiments), to investigate the 
impact of agents’ heterogeneity on economic environments such as tournaments, decentralized 
matching, and coordination games.  
 The first chapter analyzes a coordination game (a stag-hunt game) in which one of the 
equilibria gives a higher payoff to the players, but playing the corresponding strategy profile 
leading to this equilibrium entails strategic risk. In this chapter, I ask whether agents can 
coordinate on the equilibrium that gives a higher payoff when they are provided information 
about an opponent’s risk aversion. Two key insights result from my analysis. First, a subject’s 
propensity to choose the risky action depends on her opponent’s risk attitude. Second, this 
propensity is independent of the subject’s own risk attitude. 
 The second chapter compares the performance of two tournament designs when contestants 
are heterogeneous in their abilities. One of the designs is the standard winner-take-all (WTA) 
tournament, which is common both in the literature and in the real world. The alternative 
tournament design involves two tournaments with different prizes (parallel tournaments) where 
individuals choose which tournament to enter before competing. With a simple model and an 
experiment, I show that when contestants’ abilities differ substantially, the designer makes higher 
profit using parallel tournaments. Nevertheless, when the contestants’ abilities are similar, the 
designer makes higher profit in the WTA tournament.  
 The third chapter studies a two-period decentralized matching game under complete 
information with frictions in the form of time discounting. I find that the sub-game perfect Nash 
equilibrium outcome of this game coincides with a stable outcome for most preference profiles. 
The selection of which stable outcome emerges depends on the level of frictions: the sub-game 
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perfect Nash equilibrium outcome of this game yields the firm-optimal stable match (a worker-
optimal stable match) when the time discount is sufficiently high or low (intermediate values).  
 
  
vi 
 
Table of Contents 
List of Tables ................................................................................................................................ viii 
List of Figures ................................................................................................................................. ix 
Chapter 1: Introduction .................................................................................................................... 1 
Chapter 2: Risk Attitudes and the Stag-Hunt Game ........................................................................ 3 
2.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 3 
2.2 Experimental Design .......................................................................................................... 8 
2.3 Aggregate Risk Distribution and Action Choices ............................................................ 12 
2.4 Explaining Action Choices and Beliefs ............................................................................ 17 
2.5 Conclusions ...................................................................................................................... 21 
2.6 Appendix 1: Instructions and Screenshots in the Stages .................................................. 23 
Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 23 
Stage 1 .................................................................................................................................... 23 
Stage 2 .................................................................................................................................... 25 
Stage 3 .................................................................................................................................... 27 
Chapter 3: Parallel Tournaments ................................................................................................... 30 
3.1 Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 30 
3.2 Theoretical Framework ..................................................................................................... 36 
3.2.1 Single-Prize Tournament ........................................................................................... 38 
3.2.2 Parallel Tournament .................................................................................................. 40 
3.3 Experimental Design and Procedures ............................................................................... 44 
3.4 Profit ................................................................................................................................. 50 
3.5 Tournament and Effort Choices ....................................................................................... 51 
3.5.1 Aggregate Data .......................................................................................................... 51 
3.5.2 Individual Analysis .................................................................................................... 54 
vii 
 
3.6 Conclusions ...................................................................................................................... 57 
3.7 Appendix 1: Single-Prize Tournament ............................................................................. 59 
3.8 Appendix 2: Parallel Tournaments ................................................................................... 60 
3.9 Appendix 3: Proof of Proposition 1 .................................................................................. 77 
3.10 Appendix 4: .................................................................................................................... 78 
3.11 Appendix 5: Experimental Instructions for the Single Prize Tournaments .................... 79 
3.12 Appendix 6: Experimental Instructions for the Parallel Tournaments ........................... 87 
3.13 Appendix 7: Treatment Orders in the Single-Prize and Parallel Tournaments .............. 96 
Chapter 4: Decentralized Matching Market with Time Frictions .................................................. 97 
4.1 Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 97 
4.2 The Marriage Model ....................................................................................................... 101 
4.3 The Decentralized Game ................................................................................................ 102 
4.4 Preferences ..................................................................................................................... 105 
4.5 Small Time Discount ...................................................................................................... 106 
4.6 Intermediate Time Discounts .......................................................................................... 107 
4.7 Large Time Discounts .................................................................................................... 110 
4.8 Conclusions and Extensions ........................................................................................... 112 
4.9 Appendix 1: Frequency of Stable Matches as a Response to Time Discount ................ 114 
Bibliography ................................................................................................................................ 115 
 
  
viii 
 
List of Tables 
Table 2-1:  2 x 2 Stag-Hunt Game ................................................................................................... 3 
Table 2-2: The Experimental Stag-Hunt Game ............................................................................... 9 
Table 2-3: Risk-Profile Distributions of Subjects in Holt-Laury’s and My Experiments ............. 13 
Table 2-4: Distribution of Subjects’ Action Choices ..................................................................... 13 
Table 2-5: The Mean (Standard Deviation) of Subjects’ Risk and Belief Thresholds .................. 17 
Table 2-6: Probit Estimations of Risky Action Choices ................................................................ 18 
Table 3-1: Treatments .................................................................................................................... 45 
Table 3-2: Descriptive Statistics For Profit Levels ........................................................................ 50 
Table 3-3: Average High-Prize Tournament-Selection and Effort Percentages (%) in Parallel 
Tournaments. ................................................................................................................................. 52 
Table 3-4: Probit Estimation for Entering the High-Prize Tournament ......................................... 55 
Table 3-5: Probit Estimation for Choosing Equilibrium Effort in the High-Prize and Low-Prize 
Tournaments .................................................................................................................................. 56 
Table 3-6: Observed Effort Percentages (%) in the Tournaments ................................................. 78 
Table 3-7: Expected Payoffs with Experimental Distributions...................................................... 78 
Table 4-1: The Frequency of Game Outcomes ............................................................................ 114 
  
ix 
 
List of Figures 
Figure 1: Histogram Illustrating the Distribution of (Responsive) Subjects’ Cutoff Points .......... 15 
Figure 2: Belief Thresholds and Cutoff Points .............................................................................. 20 
Figure 3: Screenshot of Stage 1 ..................................................................................................... 24 
Figure 4: Screenshot of Stage 2 ..................................................................................................... 26 
Figure 5: Screenshot of Stage 3 ..................................................................................................... 28 
 
1 
 
Chapter 1:  
Introduction 
In chapter 2, Risk Attitudes and the Stag-Hunt Game, I analyze a coordination game (stag-hunt 
game). A stag-hunt game (with the risky and safe actions) has two pure Nash equilibria that are 
Pareto-rankable. The risky action leads either to the Pareto-superior equilibrium (high payoff) or 
to out of equilibrium (low payoff) depending on the other player’s action. Both players may want 
to end up in the Pareto-superior equilibrium due to its payoff. However, uncertainty about the 
other player’s action may prevent them to take such strategic risk. This paper investigates how 
information about the risk attitude of an opponent affects a player’s action choice in the stag-hunt 
game with an experiment. In the experiment, I first elicit subjects’ risk attitudes. I then allow 
subjects to play a one-shot stag-hunt game in which subjects are informed about the risk attitudes 
of their opponents. Finally, I elicit subjects’ beliefs about their opponents’ action choices.  Two 
key insights result from the analysis. First, a subject’s propensity to choose the risky action 
depends on her opponent’s risk attitude. Second, this propensity is independent of the subject’s 
own risk attitude. 
Chapter 3, Parallel Tournaments, theoretically and experimentally compares a principal’s 
profits from two tournament designs. The first design is a standard winner-take-all tournament 
with a single prize. The second design features two parallel tournaments with different prizes 
where individuals choose which tournament to enter before competing. I develop a simple model 
that illustrates how the relative performances of these designs change as contestants’ abilities 
differ. The theoretical model shows that the designer’s profit is higher (lower) in the parallel 
tournament when contestants’ abilities differ greatly (are similar). I complement these findings 
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with experimental evidence. The experiments show that the parallel tournament is more profitable 
under high heterogeneity, whereas under low heterogeneity the designer is better off with the 
single-prize tournament. Further, high-ability agents underparticipate and low-ability agents 
overparticipate in the high-prize tournament relative to the theoretical prediction.   
Chapter 4, Decentralized Matching Market with Time Frictions, studies a two-period 
decentralized matching game under complete information with time discounting. The players of 
the game are firms and workers. They calculate their expected gains from their strategies 
(proposing to a worker or accepting/rejecting an offer) according to cardinal representation of 
their match utilities. Firms sequentially make directed offers to workers in the game. I show that 
the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium outcome of this game coincides with a stable outcome for 
a specific class of preference profiles. For these preference profiles, the selection of which stable 
outcome emerges depends on the level of frictions: the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium 
outcome yields the firm-optimal stable matching when the time discount is sufficiently low or 
high. However, for intermediate time discounts, the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium outcome 
yields a worker-optimal stable matching.  
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Chapter 2:  
Risk Attitudes and the Stag-Hunt Game 
2.1 Introduction 
In many social interactions individuals try to learn (or know) other parties’ characteristics and 
accordingly form expectations about their behavior. For instance, an insurance company 
evaluates how likely its customers are to be involved in an accident with questionnaires; a 
recruiter tries to foresee whether a job candidate is a good team worker in an interview; a landlord 
tries to determine whether a potential tenant will pay the rent on time through some clues during a 
conversation. In all these examples, some additional information decreases the risk of a bad 
outcome. This paper analyzes the outcome of a stag-hunt game that has a strategic risk, when 
players are provided information about their opponents’ risk attitudes.  
In a stag-hunt game, players choose between strategically safe and risky actions 
(respectively, Action 1 and Action 2 in Table 2.1). Depending on both a player’s own and her 
opponent’s action choices, players may end up in the payoff-dominant equilibrium ((Action 2, 
Action 2)), in the risk-dominant equilibrium ((Action 1, Action 1)), or out of equilibrium ((Action 
1, Action 2), (Action 2, Action 1)).  
 Action 1  Action 2 
Action 1         
Action 2         
        
Table 2.1:  2 x 2 Stag-Hunt Game 
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In this paper, I test whether information about their opponents’ risk attitudes helps players 
prevent out of equilibrium outcomes and more importantly, helps them coordinate on the payoff-
dominant equilibrium. A player’s own risk attitude and information about the other person’s risk 
attitude should affect a player’s action (hence the game outcome) for the following reasons: 
Agents’ utility representations differ according to their risk aversion.1 In the game, risk-averse, 
risk-neutral, and risk-loving agents expect different payoffs from Action 1 (or Action 2) for the 
same belief about the other person’s action choice. Hence, their optimal action choices may 
change as a response to their beliefs: It may be optimal for a risk-averse agent to choose Action 1 
even when she thinks that her opponent chooses Action 1 with a low probability. On the other 
hand, it may be optimal for a risk-loving agent to choose Action 1 only when she thinks that her 
opponent chooses Action 1 with a high probability. This difference stems from the concave 
(convex) utility function of a risk-averse (risk-loving) agent. Similarly, when a player is informed 
about how risk averse the other person is, she will form her beliefs accordingly. She will expect a 
risk-averse opponent to choose Action 1 with a higher (lower) probability and best respond to her 
belief by choosing Action 1 (Action 2).  
To test these predictions, I design an experiment with three stages. In the first stage, I use a 
common technique (due to Holt and Laury, 2002) to elicit subjects’ risk aversion. This technique 
involves two lotteries: one risky and one safe. The riskiness of the lotteries is determined by the 
difference between the high and low payoffs. There are ten different situations and individuals are 
asked at which situation they want to switch from a “safe” lottery to a “risky” lottery (hereafter, 
the situation at which a subject switches from the “safe” lottery to the “risky” lottery is named as 
her ‘risk threshold’). At a given situation the probability of obtaining the high payoff is identical 
in both lotteries. These probabilities range from 1/10 to 1 in increments of 1/10 between 
                                                     
1 Some earlier studies (Bolton 1998; Camerer 1997; Holt and Laury 2002; Goeree, Holt, and Palfrey, 2002) 
show some deviations from the equilibrium predictions in experimental results when subjects’ risk attitudes 
are not taken into account for the payoffs. 
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situations. The expected payoff of the risky lottery becomes higher than the expected payoff of 
the safe lottery after Situation 5. Depending on agents’ being risk loving, risk averse, or risk 
neutral, they can switch from the safe lottery to the risky lottery before, after, or at Situation 5, 
respectively. In this stage, individuals bear an exogenous risk while choosing a lottery to play 
because they know with what probability they win the high payoff in a lottery for a particular 
situation.  
In the second stage, subjects play a one-shot stag-hunt game with information about their 
potential opponents’ risk thresholds. A potential opponent could have ten different risk 
thresholds. Hence, in this stage each subject plays the stag-hunt game against an opponent who 
has one of these risk thresholds in each time. At the end, subjects are randomly matched with 
someone in the laboratory. The stated action of each subject conditional on risk threshold of her 
actual opponent is taken as her action choice for the game. Here, an individual bears an 
endogenous risk while playing against a specific opponent because she does not know exactly 
with what probability the other person chooses the safe action in the game.2 In the last stage, I 
elicit players’ beliefs regarding their actual opponents’ action choices by giving information 
about their actual opponents’ risk thresholds.  
There are several findings that emerge from my analysis: First, subjects are responsive to 
information about their opponents’ risk attitudes. Indeed, 42% of subjects chose their actions 
according to their opponents’ risk attitudes. Specifically, information about an opponent’s risk 
attitude has a significant and negative effect on a subject’s propensity to choose the risky action 
i.e., the more risk averse an opponent is, the less likely a subject is to choose the risky action, as 
predicted by the theory.  
                                                     
2 For endogenous risk, a player’s uncertainty about her opponent’s risk threshold is not taken into account 
because she chooses her actions as if all cases are real.   
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Second, although theoretically a risk-averse agent should choose the safe action with a higher 
probability compared to a risk-loving agent, a player’s own risk attitude has no effect on her 
action choice. In other words, a player who personally takes more risk or less risk is equally 
likely to choose the risky action or the safe action in the game.3 Furthermore, due to the first 
result, one can expect subjects to use the following strategic reasoning while choosing their 
actions. If a subject thinks that her opponent responds to information that she is given, then she 
believes that the information about her own risk attitude will increase (if she is risk loving, or 
decrease if she is risk averse) her opponent’s propensity to choose the risky action. Hence, the 
player best responds to her belief about her opponent’s action choice by choosing an action 
according to her own risk attitude.4 Nevertheless, subjects may not be sure that all agents would 
respond to that information, hence they may not choose their actions with such reasoning.  
The last finding pertains to the effects of risk attitude information on the equilibrium 
selection. Giving information about the opponent increased the frequency of risky action choices 
and likelihood of ending up on the payoff-dominant equilibrium when risk-loving agents chose 
their actions according to their risk attitudes.5 However, due to insufficient number of risk-loving 
agents (most subjects were risk averse), the realized actions of the responsive agents’ were the 
safe action which led either the risk-dominant equilibrium or out of equilibrium at the end. 
There are three strands of literature related to this study. The first analyzes the effect of 
information about an opponent’s attributes on a player’s action choice in specific strategic 
                                                     
3 Neumann and Vogt (2009) and Al-Ubaydli et al. (2011) test the effect of a subject’s own risk attitude on 
her action choice in different stag-hunt games as well. Similar to my results, they found no effect of a 
subject’s own risk attitude on her action choice. 
4 If they knew that others respond, one would expect a subject to choose her action according to her own 
risk attitude only if she has the same risk attitude her opponent. If the subjects do not have the same risk 
attitude (both risk averse, both risk loving, or both risk neutral), they may be confused about choosing their 
actions according to their opponents’ risk attitude or their own risk attitudes. 
5 In Schmidt et al. (2003), with no information about an opponent, subjects chose the safe action with a 
frequency of 0.60, whereas in my experiment, subjects chose the safe action with a frequency of 0.47 when 
their potential opponents were risk loving. Such a behavior only increases the coordination on the payoff-
dominant equilibrium if the actual opponent is risk loving.  
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interactions. For instance, in trust games, information about an opponent’s race (Glaeser et al., 
2000; and Burns, 2012), gender (Scharleman et al., 2001; Chadhuri and Gangadheran, 2002; 
Croson and Buchon, 1999), and ethnicity (Fershtman and Gneezy, 2001; Bouckaert and Dhaene, 
2003) has an effect. In coordination games, information about an opponent’s gender (Holm, 
2000) and ethnicity (Bogach and Leibbrandt, 2011) has an effect. In bargaining games, 
information about an opponent’s initial endowments (Konow, 2000), gender, income, and status 
(Holm and Engseld, 2005) has an effect. Nonetheless, theory does not provide any guidance as to 
the effects of these sorts of attributes on action choices. This paper tests the effect of information 
about another class of attributes, risk attitudes, which theoretically should affect a player’s action 
choice in a strategic game. 
The second related strand of work analyzes the coordination issue in games with Pareto 
rankable multiple equilibria. Van Huyck et al. (1990, 1991), Cooper et al. (1992), and Straub 
(1995) show that subjects may not always coordinate on the payoff-dominant equilibrium. There 
is a fair bit of follow-up work illustrating instruments that allow players to coordinate on the 
payoff-dominant equilibrium. For instance, repeated interactions (Van Huyck et al., 1990; 
Schmidt et al., 2003), loss-avoidance (Cachon and Camerer, 1996), and communication (Clark et 
al., 2001; Cooper et al., 1992; Charness, 2000; Charness and Grosskopf, 2004; and Duffy and 
Feltovich, 2006) assist in achieving coordination in the lab. Here, I test whether players use 
information about their opponents to coordinate on either of the equilibria. 
The last strand focuses on the relationship between risk and strategic uncertainty. Heinemann 
et al. (2009) find that subjects who avoid risk also avoid strategic uncertainty, i.e., “subjects have 
similar perception for exogenous and endogenous risk if both situations are framed in a similar 
way” (page 6). Contrary to that result, but in line with Neumann and Vogt (2009) and Al-Ubaydli 
et al. (2011), I find that there is no relationship between subjects’ risk attitudes and their action 
choices in 2 x 2 stag-hunt games. In my experiment, to create similarity while framing exogenous 
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and endogenous risk, I use identical payoffs for the risky action in the game and the risky lottery.6  
Nevertheless, both risk-averse and risk-loving subjects choose the safe action in the game with 
equal probability. In addition, the current paper studies the effect of information about an 
opponent’s risk attitude on a player’s action choice and equilibrium selection, which, to the best 
of my knowledge, has never been studied.  
2.2 Experimental Design 
The experiment was conducted at the Social Science Experimental Laboratory (SSEL) at the 
California Institute of Technology (Caltech). Subjects were recruited by e-mail using the SSEL 
database, which consists of graduate and undergraduate students at Caltech. Overall, 50 subjects 
participated in the experiment. There were six sessions and each lasted 45 minutes. Each subject 
participated in only one session. All sessions were computerized using z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007). 
Throughout the experiment, payoffs were described in terms of “experimental units” (hereafter, 
EU). Eight EU corresponded to one dollar. A subject earned $19.05 on average, including a $5 
participation fee. The experiment consisted of three stages.7 
In the first stage, I elicited the risk attitude of each subject by Holt and Laury’s (2002) 
method. According to this method, subjects must choose one of two lotteries available for ten 
different situations (figure 3 in appendix 1). In Situation 1, the less-risky lottery (Option A) has a 
higher expected payoff than the more-risky one (Option B). Hence, only very strong risk lovers 
pick Option B in this situation. Moving further down the table in figure 3, the expected payoff 
difference between the lotteries in Option A and in Option B decreases and eventually turns 
negative in Situation 5. In Situation 10, all subjects must choose between a sure payoff of 40 EU 
(Option A) and a sure payoff of 77 EU (Option B). Since all rational individuals prefer the latter 
                                                     
6 In Heinemann et al. (2009), individuals stated certainty equivalents for a different game and lottery. 
7 The instructions in a session were read stage by stage. It was ensured that no subject could read the next 
stage’s instruction before the current stage ended to prevent any kind of hedging among different periods’ 
payoffs. Full instructions for the stages and their screenshots can be found in appendix A.  
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one in the last situation, by then all subjects should have switched from Option A to Option B. In 
this experiment, a consistent subject should switch from Option A to Option B just once. 
However, earlier experiments using Holt and Laury’s (2002) method showed that some subjects 
may go back and forth between Option A and Option B. To prevent such behavior in my 
experiment, I asked subjects when they wanted to switch from Option A to Option B which is 
named as their risk thresholds throughout the paper. 
The payoffs for the lottery choices in the experiment were selected so that the risk 
threshold point would provide an interval estimate of a subject’s constant relative risk aversion 
(CRRA). With these payoffs, it is optimal for a risk-neutral subject to switch from Option A to 
Option B in Situation 5. Similarly, it is optimal for a risk-averse (risk-loving) subject to switch 
from Option A to Option B after (before) Situation 5. The payment for this stage was determined 
according to a randomly chosen row among these ten situations and the subject’s lottery choice in 
that particular row.  
 Action 1 Action 2 
Action 1 57, 57 57, 2 
Action 2 2, 57 77, 77 
Table 2.2: The Experimental Stag-Hunt Game 
In the second stage, each subject stated her action choice for the game in Table 2.2 
contingent on her potential opponent’s risk threshold (figure 4 in appendix 1). A potential 
opponent could have ten different risk thresholds based on her decision in the first stage. I elicit a 
player’s action choice against an opponent with one of these risk thresholds at each time8 to 
prevent subjects thinking that they should respond to risk threshold information. At the end of the 
stage subjects were randomly matched. The stated action of each subject conditional on her actual 
opponent’s risk threshold, was taken as the action she chose for the game and was used to 
determine her payoff for this stage. 
                                                     
8 Each player plays the game 10 times. 
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The monetary payoffs in Table 2.2 were specified as follows: First, to allow subjects to 
make a connection between the first and second stages of the experiment, similar monetary 
payoffs were chosen for the risky lottery (Option B) in Stage 1 and for the risky action (Action 2) 
in Stage 2. In particular, Option B offered 77 EU as the high payoff and 2 EU as the low payoff in 
Stage 1. Similarly, Action 2 may have resulted in either 77 EU when an opponent chooses Action 
2 or 2 EU when an opponent chooses Action 1 in Stage 2. Second, to create a trade-off between 
the payoff-dominant equilibrium and the risk-dominant equilibrium, the safe action’s return was 
chosen as 57 EU.9 Schmidt et al. (2003) show that when Selten’s (1995) risk measure,   
   [
( (                )  (                ))
( (                )  (                ))
], is greater than 0 subjects are more likely to have a 
conflict between the payoff-dominant equilibrium and the risk-dominant equilibrium in a stag-
hunt game.10 By choosing the safe action’s payoff as 57 EU, the risk measure of the game 
becomes    (
 (  )  ( )
  (  )  (  )
), which is greater than 0 for any subject. 
In the third stage, I elicited subjects’ beliefs about their opponents’ actions. To elicit their 
beliefs truthfully regardless of their risk attitudes, I used a method inspired by Becker et al. 
(1964) and developed by Grether (1981). According to this method, there are ten decisions and 
two alternatives, Alternative 1 and Alternative 2. Alternative 1 offered 16 EU to subjects only if 
their opponents had chosen Action 1 in the second stage. Alternative 2 offered subjects lotteries 
that gave 16 EU with probabilities ranging from 1/10 to 1 in increments of 1/10 between 
decisions (figure 5 in appendix 1).11
, 12 Each subject was provided information about the risk 
threshold of her actual opponent in the game and was asked when she wanted to switch from 
                                                     
9 Selten’s risk measure is greater than 0 when Action 1’s payoff is between 55 and 76. I chose this payoff as 
57, closer to the lower bound to have a higher trade-off between risk and payoff, i.e., higher risk measure. 
10 When   is less than 0 subjects are more likely to end up in the payoff-dominant equilibrium. 
11 Belief elicitation was made after the action choice to prevent subjects from thinking that they should act 
consistently with their beliefs. 
12 I start the probability of the lottery at 1/10 because I can only get interval information for the belief in 
each decision. Always choosing Alternative 2 implies that the agent believes her opponent will chose the 
safe action lower than a probability of 1/10. 
11 
 
Alternative 1 to Alternative 2 among ten different decisions. The point she switched at was 
named as her belief threshold throughout the paper. One can interpret the belief threshold as 
follows: A subject believes that her opponent chose the safe action in the second stage at most 
with the probability of the lottery that she switched to. For instance, assume that a subject 
switched from Alternative 1 to Alternative 2 in Decision 5. This implies her belief about her 
opponent’s safe action choice is at most 5/10, and since she did not switch from Alternative 1 to 
Alternative 2 earlier, her belief is higher than 4/10. Hence, she believes that her opponent chooses 
the safe action with a probability that is higher than 4/10 and less than 5/10.  
There are three theoretical hypotheses that I aimed to test. The first hypothesis is that a 
subject’s own risk threshold negatively affects the likelihood of her risky action choice. This 
holds for the following reason: The payoffs in the game table are monetary payoffs and when 
they are converted to CRRA utilities,13 subjects’ best response behavior will be as follows: An 
extremely risk loving subject (with a risk aversion parameter below -0.49) chooses the safe action 
if she expects her opponent to choose the safe action with a probability higher than 0.41. 
However, an extremely risk averse subject (with a risk aversion parameter above 1.37) chooses 
the safe action if she expects her opponent to choose the safe action with a probability higher than 
0.06. As a subject’s risk aversion increases, the subject’s safe action choice becomes optimal with 
a lower belief about the other person’s safe action choice. In particular, the more risk averse a 
subject is, the more likely she is to choose the safe action. The second hypothesis is that 
information about an opponent’s risk aversion affects the likelihood of a subject’s risky action 
choice. When a subject is given information about her opponent’s risk attitude, she will take into 
account that information while forming her beliefs about her opponent’s action choice. In other 
words, a player believes that a risk-averse opponent is more likely to choose the safe action; 
                                                     
13 The CRRA utility of a subject is  ( )  
    
   
, where   is monetary payment and r is risk aversion 
coefficient. For relative risk aversion coefficients,  , I first found the corresponding intervals from the 
subjects' risk threshold points in Stage 1 then I took the average of the boundaries of these intervals.  
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hence, with such information about an opponent she is more likely to choose the safe action as a 
best response. The third hypothesis is that information about an opponent’s risk aversion affects 
players’ beliefs and actions in a similar way. In particular, a player’s belief about her opponent’s 
safe action would be positively correlated with the subject’s own risk aversion and her opponent’s 
risk aversion. This should hold because agents’ actions choices are driven by their beliefs. 
2.3 Aggregate Risk Distribution and Action Choices 
I start by describing the risk-profile distribution of the subjects. Table 2.3 shows the implied risk-
aversion intervals by the number of Option A choices in Stage 1 and the risk-profile distributions 
of the subjects in my experiment and in Holt and Laury’s (2002) experiment.14 I use a two-sample 
z-test to compare subjects’ percentages in each group from both experiments. I find that the 
percentage differences between the groups in my experiment and Holt and Laury's (2002) 
experiment are not significant, except for the group that is classified as the “slightly risk averse”.  
In terms of the action profiles in Stage 2, subjects can be classified into one of five 
different groups. Subjects with the action profiles Always Action 1, Always Action 2, and 
Nonmonotonic were not responsive to the information that they were given, i.e., they chose their 
actions independently of their opponents’ risk attitudes. Subjects with the action profile Always 
Action 1 (Always Action 2) chose the safe (risky) action against potential opponents with any 
risk preferences. Subjects with the action profile Nonmonotonic chose their actions randomly. 
Subjects with the action profiles Interior Cutoff and Almost Interior Cutoff were responsive to 
information provided to them. The first responsive group chose the risky action until a certain risk 
threshold point (cutoff point) of their potential opponents and then shifted to the safe action. The 
                                                     
14 In Holt and Laury’s (2002) treatment, Option A gives $2 with probability   and $1.60 with probability 
(   ). Option B gives $3.85 with probability   and $0.10 with probability (   ). 
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second responsive group violated the Interior Cutoff action profile just once.15 Table 2.4 shows 
the percentages of subjects using these action profiles.  
Number of 
Option A 
Choices 
Range of Relative Risk 
Aversion for  ( )  
    
   
 
Risk Preference 
Classification 
Proportion of Choices 
 
Holt-Laury        This paper 
0–1         highly risk loving 1% 4% 
2               very risk loving 1% 2% 
3               risk loving 6% 4% 
4              risk neutral 26% 36% 
5             slightly risk averse 26% 8% 
6             risk averse 23% 26% 
7             very risk averse 13% 8% 
8             highly risk averse 3% 8% 
9–10        very highly risk averse 3% 4% 
Table 2.3: Risk-Profile Distributions of Subjects in Holt-Laury’s and My Experiments 
 
Action profiles Percentage of subjects 
Always Action 1 32% 
Always Action 2 16% 
Interior Cutoff  34% 
Almost Interior Cutoff 8% 
Nonmonotonic 10% 
Table 2.4: Distribution of Subjects’ Action Choices 
I compared subjects’ action choices in my experiment with action choices in a one-shot 
stag-hunt game experiment where agents knew nothing about their opponents’ risk attitudes (The 
baseline is Schmidt et al., 2003). I chose Schmidt et al. (2003) as a baseline for two reasons: (1) 
They stated action frequencies for a one-shot stag-hunt game. (2) They used a game with a risk 
                                                     
15 A subject who uses the Almost Interior Cutoff may use the safe action once among the risky actions 
before the cutoff point or she may use the risky action once among the safe actions after the cutoff point. 
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measure16
, 17 of     ( ), which is very close to the risk measure of the game utilized in the reported 
experiment,     (    ). In their experiment, subjects chose the safe action with a frequency of 
0.60.18 In my experiment, subjects chose the safe action with a frequency of 0.47 when their 
potential opponents were risk loving (having a risk preference smaller than 0.15) and the safe 
action with a frequency of 0.74 when their potential opponents were risk averse (having a risk 
preference bigger than 0.15).  
Furthermore, I compared my findings with the study of Clark et al. (2001), which tested 
the effect of communication on subjects’ action choices in a stag-hunt game. They used three 
different games and the closest one of these games to the game in this paper was Game I with a 
risk measure of     ( ). To compare their results with my results, I took only the frequencies in 
the first round of their 10-round experiment (figure 3 and 4, on page 501 of their paper). In their 
experiment, without communication subjects chose the safe action with a frequency of 0.70 
whereas with communication subjects chose the safe action with a frequency of 0.40.19 The 
subjects’ safe-action frequency dropped dramatically with communication in Clark et al. (2001). 
In my experiment depending on an opponent’s risk attitude subjects chose the safe action less or 
more frequently than the baseline. In particular, assume 0.60 as the baseline probability for the 
safe-action play absent communication.20 In the experiment the direction of the change was as 
predicted by the theory: the safe-action frequency dropped from 0.60 to 0.47 when subjects were 
matched with risk-loving agents and increased from 0.60 to 074 when subjects were matched 
with risk-averse agents. In terms of magnitudes, the information about an opponent’s risk attitude 
does not affect the safe action frequency as much as direct communication. However, both helped 
                                                     
16 Game 2 and Game 4 of their experiment has the closest risk measure to the one used in this experiment. 
17 See page 6 for Selten’s risk measure formula. 
18 Schmidt et al. (2003) showed frequencies of action choices in one-shot games at the first row of table 3 in 
page 296. I used Game 2 and Game 4 as baselines, which have frequencies, 0.60 and 0.58 respectively. 
19 The difference in the safe-action frequencies between Schmidt et al. (2003) and without communication 
treatment of Clark et al. (2001) may stem from the difference in risk measures (    ( ) and     ( ) 
respectively) of the games. In particular, the perceived risk in the latter is higher; hence the safe-action 
frequency is higher. 
20 Baseline is considered as Schmidt et al. (2003). 
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agents to choose the risky action more often and hence increased the chance of coordinating on 
the payoff-dominant equilibrium. 
To better understand how responsiveness to information about an opponent’s risk attitude 
could affect equilibrium selection, I analyze the responsive groups in more detail. Figure 1 shows 
the distribution of interior cutoff points for the subjects who used the Interior Cutoff and Almost 
Interior Cutoff profiles.  
 
Figure 1: Histogram Illustrating the Distribution of (Responsive) Subjects’ Cutoff Points. 
On average, subjects’ risk preferences could be classified between 0.41 and 0.68, i.e., the 
subject group was risk averse. However, according to the histogram, only five subjects (out of 42, 
all subjects except the ones choosing Always Action 2) continued to choose the risky action 
against potential opponents who had risk preferences above 0.41. Recall that after subjects’ action 
profiles had been elicited they were matched randomly. The actions they chose based on their 
actual opponents’ risk thresholds were taken as their actions for the game. By the distribution in 
figure 1, one can conclude that subjects’ action choices were mostly the safe action when they 
were matched with their actual opponents in the laboratory. Hence, subjects could either 
coordinate on the risk-dominant equilibrium or could not coordinate at all. 
0
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Higher coordination rate on the payoff-dominant equilibrium in the experiments could have 
been achieved as risk information is provided, if either of the following conditions held: (1) Most 
subjects in the subject group continued to choose the risky action when their potential opponents 
had a risk preference around 0.41 and 0.68 (which is the average risk preference of the subject 
group). (2) The subject group had a risk preference around -0.49 and 0.15. Only under these 
conditions would the number of subjects choosing the risky action while playing with their actual 
opponents increase. 
Another reason for ending up out of equilibrium is the difference between chosen action-
profiles.21 Among 25 pairs, 12 could not coordinate (48%), 10 coordinated on the risk-dominant 
equilibrium (40%), and 3 coordinated on the payoff-dominant equilibrium (12%).  
In terms of the pure effects of risk information on selection, the extant literature does not 
offer assessments of equilibrium frequencies in one-shot stag-hunt games absent any information 
about subjects’ opponents. Since I compared action choices in this paper with action choices in 
Clark et al. (2001) and Schmidt et al. (2003), I first checked these papers for the frequencies of 
equilibrium or disequilibrium choices. Both papers have not discussed frequencies of outcomes 
for one-shot games but Clark et al. (2001) stated these frequencies for all rounds of a repeated 
stag-hunt game. They found that for all rounds without communication subjects successfully 
coordinate on the payoff-dominant equilibrium 2% of the time, on the risk-dominant equilibrium 
30% of the time, and they could not coordinate 68% of the time. However, with communication 
subjects successfully coordinate on the payoff-dominant equilibrium 70% of the time, on the risk-
dominant equilibrium 13.5% of the time, and they could not coordinate 16.5% of the time.  
                                                     
21 In three pairs one of the subjects used Always Action 1 and the other used Always Action 2. In three 
pairs one of the subjects followed Always Action 2 and the other used the Cutoff action profile. In two 
pairs one of the subjects used Always Action 1 and the other used the Cutoff action profile. In addition to 
these, there are four more pairs (Always Action 1 and Nonmonotonic, both Nonmonotonic, both Cutoff) 
with action profiles leading to an out of equilibrium outcome. 
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In my experiment, subjects ended up playing the payoff-dominant equilibrium 12% of the 
time, which is less often than in the “with communication” (70%) and more often than in the 
“without communication” (2%) treatments of Clark et al. (2001). Furthermore, subjects 
coordinated on the risk-dominant equilibrium 40% of the time which is more often than in the 
“with communication” (13.5%) and “without communication” (30%) treatments of Clark et al. 
(2001). Last, they ended up out of equilibrium 48% of the time which is more often than in the 
“with communication” (16.5%) and less often than in the “without communication” (68%) 
treatment of Clark et al. (2001). According to these comparisons, subjects coordinate on the 
payoff-dominant and risk-dominant equilibria in my experiment more often than their “without 
communication” treatment. Nevertheless, they could not coordinate on the payoff-dominant 
equilibrium through risk-attitude information as much as they did via direct communication. 
2.4 Explaining Action Choices and Beliefs 
I start by providing some descriptive results. In Table 2.5, columns correspond to the groups with 
different action profiles in Stage 2; the Risk row contains the mean and standard deviation of risk 
thresholds (Stage 1); and the Belief row contains the mean and standard deviation of belief 
thresholds (Stage 3). The means in all columns of the Risk row are not significantly different 
from one another, i.e., there is no relationship between the chosen action profile and a subject’s 
own risk aversion. 
Thresholds/Groups Always Action 1 
Group 
Always Action 2 
Group 
Interior and 
Almost Interior 
Cutoff Group 
Nonmonotonic 
Group 
Risk (Stage 1) 6.19 (2.2) 6.25 (1.75) 6 (2.1) 6.2 (1.1) 
Belief (Stage 3) 7.19 (2.6) 2.75 (2.49) 5 (2.19) 5.2 (2.05) 
Table 2.5: The Mean (Standard Deviation) of Subjects’ Risk and Belief Thresholds 
The Belief row illustrates the subjects’ best-response behavior. The subjects in the 
Always Action 1 group had significantly higher belief thresholds than the subjects in the Interior 
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and Almost Interior Cutoff group (Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p = 0.0029). In other words, they 
believe that their opponents chose the safe action with a higher probability than the subjects in the 
Interior and Almost Interior Cutoff group do. As a response, they chose the safe action more often 
than the subjects in that group. Similarly, subjects in the Interior and Almost Interior Cutoff 
group had significantly higher belief thresholds than subjects in the Always Action 2 group 
(Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p = 0.0265). There is no significant difference between the belief 
thresholds of the subjects in the Interior and Almost Interior Cutoff group and the subjects in the 
Nonmonotonic group.  
Dependent Variable Probability of Choosing the Risky Action in the Game 
Model 
Condition 
(1) Probit 
All 
(2) Probit 
All 
(3) Probit 
Responsive group 
Own Risk Threshold -0.018 (0.028) -0.042 (0.034) -0.051 (0.065) 
Opponent's Risk Threshold -0.043
***
(0.011) -0.071
**
(0.030) -0.159
**
(0.069) 
Interaction - 0.005 (0.005) 0.002 (0.009) 
# Observations 500 500 210 
Robust standard errors are in parenthesis and clustered by subjects 
* significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level 
Table 2.6: Probit Estimations of Risky Action Choices  
Next, I test whether the probability of choosing the risky action is affected by a subject’s 
own risk threshold and her opponent’s risk threshold by using various probit models. Table 2.6 
contains the results of my estimations. In Model (1) the independent variables are only a subject’s 
own risk attitude and her opponent’s risk attitude,22 whereas in Models (2) and (3), there is an 
interaction term in addition to the independent variables of Model (1).23 Furthermore, while 
Models (1) and (2) utilized all subjects, Model (3) used only the group of subjects that was 
                                                     
22 An alternative specification using the mean and upper bounds of the risk aversion parameter intervals 
instead of the risk threshold points generate identical qualitative results. 
23 By interaction term, one can understand the effect of the differences between players’ risk aversion 
parameters on the players’ actions, i.e., whether a risk-averse (risk-loving) person is more likely to choose 
the safe action when she is paired with a risk-averse (risk-loving) person. 
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responsive to an opponent’s risk attitude information, i.e., subjects with Interior Cutoff and 
Almost Interior Cutoff action profiles.  
In Model (1), among the independent variables, I find that only the opponent’s risk threshold 
significantly affects the subject’s propensity to choose the risky action. Every additional increase 
in the opponent’s risk threshold decreases the probability of a subject’s risky action choice by 
0.043. This result supports my prediction regarding the relationship between the probability of the 
subject choosing the risky action and the risk attitude of an opponent. When I add the interaction 
term to the regression the result does not change much. In Model (2), the only significant variable 
is still an opponent’s risk threshold, with a marginal effect of -0.071 on the probability of a 
subject’s risky action choice. In Model (3), still only the opponent’s risk threshold point 
significantly affects the probability of the risky action decision, but with a higher magnitude. 
Every additional increase in an opponent’s risk threshold point decreases the probability of the 
subject choosing the risky action by 0.159. In all regressions, a subject’s own risk attitude does 
not affect the probability of the subject’s risky action choice significantly, contrary to what was 
predicted.  
I also look at the relationship between players’ beliefs and their risk attitudes. Theoretically 
players’ risk attitudes should affect players’ beliefs in the same way they affect players’ action 
choices. Nevertheless, limitation in data volume does not allow me to assess the response of 
beliefs to information regarding risk attitudes. 
Figure 2 reports the relationship between belief thresholds and cutoff points by excluding the 
subjects with a Nonmonotonic action profile.24 In the figure, each node corresponds to a belief 
threshold and a cutoff point for a subject, where a belief threshold gives information about how 
likely a player thinks her actual opponent will choose Action 1 (i.e., a high belief threshold says 
                                                     
24 The cutoff point of a subject with Interior Cutoff and Almost Interior Cutoff action profiles ranges from 1 
to 10. The cutoff point of a subject with Always Action 1 is considered as zero and the cutoff point of a 
subject with Always Action 2 is considered as eleven. 
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that a subject believes that her opponent will choose Action 1 with a high probability). The 
significant and negative correlation, -0.63, between those two is consistent with best-response 
behavior. The lower a subject’s cutoff point, i.e. the less likely she is to play the risky action, the 
more she believes her opponent will choose the safe action.  
 
Figure 2: Belief Thresholds and Cutoff Points. 
In the figure, the solid red line represents a risk-neutral subject’s25 best-response behavior. A 
risk-neutral subject chooses the risky action (the safe action) if her belief about her opponent’s 
safe-action choice is below (above) 0.27 (solid red line in figure 2). Although many subjects have 
belief thresholds above 3, i.e., they believe that their opponents choose the safe-action with a 
probability higher than 0.30, few agents always chose the safe action (cutoff at zero). Hence, one 
can conclude from the figure that information about an opponent’s risk attitude increased the 
risky action choice despite the agents’ beliefs. 
Additionally, I check subjects’ best-response behavior with the belief data from Stage 3 
and the action data from Stage 2. Since I can only access the intervals of subjects’ beliefs by the 
                                                     
25 Nodes represent agents with various risk attitudes, but I consider a risk-neutral agent’s behavior as a 
representative. 
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belief thresholds, for the analysis I take the average of the upper and lower bounds of that 
interval. When subjects are assumed to have linear (CRRA) utility functions, 80% (78%) of them 
best respond to their beliefs.26 Costa-Gomes and Weizsacker (2008) studied the best-response 
behavior of subjects in 3 x 3 games. They found that 50.5% of subjects best respond. Later, Rey-
Biel (2009) replicated that experiment with simpler 3 x 3 games (constant-sum and single-digit 
payoffs). He found that 67.2% of subjects best respond to their beliefs. In particular, the higher 
percentage of best-response behavior was observed when the game became simpler. In my 
experiment, the game is 2 x 2 and possibly simpler than the games used in those studies. I observe 
a higher percentage of subjects best responding than Costa-Gomes and Weizsacker (2008) and 
Rey-Biel (2009) do.  
2.5 Conclusions 
This paper is the first study to analyze the effect of information about an opponent’s risk attitude 
on subjects’ behavior in stag-hunt games. There are three main messages from the experiment. 
First, subjects utilize information regarding their opponents’ risk attitudes when they choose their 
actions. Second, players’ own risk attitudes have no significant effect on their action choices. 
Third, such information is insufficient for players to coordinate on the payoff-dominant 
equilibrium due to insufficient number of risk-loving agents and their action choices that are 
independent from their risk attitudes. 
According to the results, although informing subjects about their opponents’ risk attitudes 
increased the frequency of their risky action choices, the number of agents who coordinated on 
the payoff-dominant equilibrium remained low. Players’ responsiveness to information about 
their opponents’ risk attitude would increase coordination on the payoff-dominant equilibrium 
                                                     
26
 Nine subjects did not best respond under the CRRA utility or the linear utility. Seven of those nine 
subjects chose their actions independently of her opponent's risk attitude (Always Action 1, Always Action 
2, or Nonmonotonic). One subject who best respond under the linear utility but not under the CRRA utility 
was extremely risk loving. 
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more if either most agents were risk loving or players continued to choose the risky action even 
when their potential opponents were slightly risk averse.  
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2.6 Appendix 1: Instructions and Screenshots in the Stages  
Introduction 
There will be three stages in this experiment. The instructions for each stage will be read just 
before the stage starts. In each stage, you will try to maximize your earnings. You will observe 
your earnings only at the end of the experiment. Throughout the experiment, payoffs are 
described in terms of “experimental units.” Eight experimental units correspond to $1. Your final 
earnings will be rounded up to a quarter. Besides what you earn during the experiment, you will 
be paid a $5 show-up fee. 
Stage 1 
In the first stage of the experiment, you will face 10 different situations. Each situation indicates 
your chances of winning a certain payoff. For instance, consider Situation 1. 
In Situation 1 Option A offers 40 experimental units with probability 1/10 and 32 experimental 
units with probability 9/10.  
In Situation 1 Option B offers 77 experimental units with probability 1/10 and 2 experimental 
units with probability 9/10.  
For each situation, you are asked to choose between the two specified options, Option A and 
Option B, until you choose Option B for some situation. Once you choose Option B, the choices 
for the following situations can only be Option B.  
In the screen, you will notice a box at the bottom of the table. You are asked to enter the number 
of the situation at which you decide to shift from Option A to Option B in that box.  
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Figure 3: Screenshot of Stage 1. 
For instance, if you decide to shift at Situation 3, this implies you chose “Option A” in Situations 
1 and 2, and you chose “Option B” in Situation 3 and in all the situations after Situation 3. 
Your payment for this stage will be determined randomly (and revealed to you only at the end of 
the experiment) as follows: 
First, we will choose a random number between 1 and 10, which will determine which situation 
will be selected for your payment. Suppose your randomly drawn situation is 7. And suppose you 
chose Option A in that situation. 
Then, we will implement your chosen option in the determined situation. We will again 
randomize a number between 1 and 10. If it is lower than or equal to 7 (occurring with probability 
7/10), you will receive 40 experimental units. Otherwise, if the number is between 8 and 10 
(occurring with probability 3/10), you will receive 32 experimental units. 
25 
 
Stage 2 
 
 
 Action 1 Action 2 
Action 1 57, 57 57, 2 
Action 2 2, 57 77, 77 
 
The table above describes the following game. There are two players in the game: you and the 
other player. Your actions and payoffs are colored in red; the other player’s actions and payoffs 
are colored in green. You each have two actions: Action 1 and Action 2. In order to play the 
game, both of you simultaneously choose one of your actions. Your earnings depend both on your 
action choices and the other person’s action choices. If you and the other person both play Action 
1, both of you will earn 57 experimental units. If you play Action 1 and the other person plays 
Action 2, while your payoff from this game will be 57 experimental units, the other person’s 
payoff will be 2 experimental units. If you play Action 2 and the other person plays Action 1, 
your payoff from this game will be 2 experimental units, while the other person’s payoff will be 
57 experimental units. If you and the other person both play Action 2, you will each get 77 
experimental units. 
In this second stage of the experiment, you will be asked to state your action choice conditional 
on which situation the other person switched at in Stage 1. For instance, one of the questions in 
Stage 2 is as follows: “Suppose that the other person that you are matched with switched to 
Option B in Situation 6; which action would you like to play, Action 1 or Action 2?”. For this 
question, you are asked to enter 1 for “Action 1” choice and 2 for “Action 2” choice in the box.  
You 
Other person 
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Your payment in this stage will be determined as follows: You will be matched randomly with a 
person in the experimental group. The action that you stated for the situation at which the other 
person switched in Stage 1 will be taken as your chosen action for the game. Similarly, the action 
that the other person stated for the situation at which you switched in Stage 1 will be taken as 
his/her chosen action for the game. These stated action choices will determine your payments by 
the game table above.  
For example, suppose you switched at Situation 4 and the other person switched at Situation 8 in 
Stage 1. In Stage 2, when you were asked which action you would choose when the other person 
switched at Situation 8, you wrote Action 1; and when the other person was asked which action 
he/she would choose when the other person switched at Situation 4, he/she wrote Action 2. By 
these action choices, you earn 57 experimental units and the other person earns 2 experimental 
units from this stage, according to game table above. 
 
Figure 4: Screenshot of Stage 2. 
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Stage 3 
In the third stage of the experiment, you will face 10 different decisions. For each decision you 
have 2 different alternatives: 
Alternative 1 depends on the other person’s action choice in Stage 2 (the action of the person 
with whom you actually matched in Stage 2) and it is the same under all decisions. In all 
decisions, Alternative 1 provides 16 experimental units if the other person chose Action 1 in the 
previous stage and nothing if he/she chose Action 2. 
Alternative 2 is always a lottery.  For instance, for Decision 1, Alternative 2 provides 16 
experimental units with probability 1/10 and nothing with probability 9/10.  
For each decision, you are asked to choose between the two specified alternatives, Alternative 1 
and Alternative 2, until you choose Alternative 2 for some decision. Once you choose Alternative 
2, the choices for the following decisions can only be Alternative 2.  
On the screen, in addition to the table, you will be given the number of the situation in which the 
other person with whom you actually played the game in Stage 2 switched in Stage 1. Then you 
will notice a box at the top of the table. You are asked to enter the number of the decision at 
which you decide to shift from Alternative 1 to Alternative 2 in that box.  
For instance, if you decide to shift at Decision 3, this implies you chose Alternative 1 in Decision 
1 and 2, and you chose Alternative 2 in Decision 3 and in all subsequent decisions. In other 
words, for Decisions 1 and 2, you are choosing the lottery, which gives money if and only if the 
other person, whom you matched with in the previous stage, chose Action 1. By Decision 3, you 
are choosing a lottery that pays a certain amount of money with some probability (increasing as 
the number of the decision increases). 
Your payment in this stage will be determined randomly as follows: 
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First, we will choose a random number between 1 and 10, which will determine which decision 
will be selected for your payment. Suppose your randomly drawn decision is 7. 
Then, we will implement your chosen alternative in the determined decision. Suppose you chose 
Alternative 1 in Decision 7.  We will look at the other person’s action choice in the previous stage 
and if it was Action 1, you will earn 16 experimental units; if it was Action 2, you will earn 0.  
Or, suppose in this decision, instead of Alternative 1 you chose Alternative 2. Then we will 
randomize a number between 1 and 10. If it is lower than or equal to 7 (occurring with probability 
7/10), you will receive 16 experimental units. Otherwise, if the number is between 8 and 10 
(occurring with probability 3/10), you will receive nothing. 
 
Figure 5: Screenshot of Stage 3. 
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Survey 
Please briefly write down how you responded to the following experimental tasks: 
1. In Stage 2, what affected your action choice? What were you thinking while choosing 
your action conditional on your opponent’s switching point? 
2. In Stage 3, what made you to switch from Alternative 1 to Alternative 2 at that specific 
“decision”? 
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Chapter 3:  
Parallel Tournaments 
3.1 Introduction 
Schools, sporting events, companies, and many other institutions use tournaments to incentivize 
agents by giving rewards based on their relative performances. Two features are common. First, 
agent performance is correlated with underlying ability. Second, ability is heterogeneous. For 
instance, students may differ in their IQs, which in turn affect their school performance; runners 
may differ in their physiology, which affects their speed; and firms may have different R&D 
investment, which affects their ability to innovate.  
           In this paper, I theoretically and experimentally compare the performance of two 
tournament designs accounting for heterogeneity in contestants’ abilities. One of the designs is 
the standard winner-take-all (henceforth “single-prize” or “WTA”) tournament, which is common 
in the literature and the real world. In WTA tournaments, only the contestant with the highest 
performance receives a prize. The other design involves two tournaments with different prizes 
(henceforth “parallel”), where individuals can choose which tournament to enter before 
competing (within each tournament, the individual with the highest performance receives a prize). 
The main conclusion of this paper, both theoretically and experimentally, is that under high 
heterogeneity the designer is better off using parallel tournaments and under low heterogeneity 
the designer is better off using a single-prize tournament.27 
                                                     
27 The designer compares the difference between the sum of expected effort, which is observable, and the 
sum of the expected given prize in two tournament designs. 
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              Consider the following practical example: a school with two types of students, differing 
in their scholarly abilities, wants to maximize its students’ performances in a course with a 
minimal cost. Each student wants to be the best in the course and hence receive a good reference 
from the instructor. Suppose the school requires all students to enroll in the same class. If the 
range of students’ abilities is large enough, the best students can obtain good grades without 
working hard and always obtain better references than the lower-ability students. The lower-
ability students may not work hard either, because they anticipate that they will never perform as 
well as the other students and thus expect to always receive worse references. At the same time, 
this course may be costly for the school if the school is paying to the teacher hourly. The reason is 
that, it may be hard for a teacher to teach the same material to high-ability and low-ability 
students, hence the teacher may need to spend more time at the class. Now, suppose that the 
school offers two different classes, basic and advanced, and allows students to choose which class 
to take. The higher-ability students may enroll and compete in the advanced class and try to get 
the most impressive references. The lower-ability students may opt for the basic class and 
compete to get good references. A more homogenous division of students in the classes may 
increase the performances of the high-ability and low-ability students. From the teachers’ point of 
view, this homogeneity may allow them to teach their material more easily; hence they will not 
spend extra time for teaching. However, having two classes may decrease student performance, 
because there would be fewer students in each class to compete with; students may not work as 
hard as they would if they were all together. In this paper, I examine under what ability difference 
between students the school would offer one or two classes. To answer this question, I develop a 
simple model with two contestants, which turns out to be enough to explore the key trade-offs. 
The model features two agents, who are privately informed about their randomly 
determined abilities (high or low) and an employer, who only knows the agents’ potential 
abilities. First, the employer decides which tournament to offer: a single-prize tournament or two 
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parallel tournaments with different prizes. In the single-prize tournament, each agent chooses an 
effort level (low or high) for a given prize. The contestant with the higher effort wins the prize. In 
the parallel tournaments (basic and advanced courses in the example) with different prizes, each 
contestant first chooses which tournament to compete in. Afterwards, he learns whether his 
opponent chose the same tournament or not, and then he chooses an effort level. Again, the 
contestant with the higher effort wins the chosen tournament’s prize. In both tournaments, 
whether the agent wins the prize or not, he bears the cost of his effort. The designer’s profit is the 
difference between his revenue from the agents’ effort and his cost of prizes.  
I characterize the unique Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium of each game. I specifically 
look at equilibrium conditions where agents sort into tournaments according to their abilities, i.e., 
high-ability agents vie for the high prize and low-ability agents compete for the low prize. To 
maximize his profit, given the agents’ behavior in equilibrium, the designer then offers the 
smallest prizes that incentivize agents and guarantees them a positive expected utility.28 
Alternatively, the designer can offer a tournament with a single prize to all agents (high and low 
types). Knowing the agents’ total efforts in equilibrium under both tournament designs and the 
optimal prizes, the designer compares his profit from these tournaments and chooses the one with 
the higher profit. 
I find that when the difference between agents’ abilities is large, it is more profitable for 
the designer to organize parallel tournaments with two different prizes. This is because when bad 
types’ marginal cost of effort is really high, the designer must offer a high prize to ensure a 
positive expected payoff for low-ability agents in equilibrium of the single-prize tournament. 
However, it is less costly for the designer to incentivize both types with parallel tournaments 
where high-ability agents choose the tournament with a high prize and low-ability agents choose 
                                                     
28 The profit is calculated in expected terms. Specifically, with probability 0.5, there will be one high-ability and one 
low-ability worker and both bonuses will be given. With probability 0.25, both workers will be low ability and only the 
low bonus will be given. With probability 0.25, both workers will be high ability and only the high bonus will be given. 
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the tournament with a low prize. Further, I find that when the difference between agents’ abilities 
is small it is more profitable for the designer to organize a single-prize tournament. This stems 
from the fact that when the cost difference is small the designer can guarantee a positive expected 
payoff for low-ability agents with a small prize.  
Comparing different tournament designs with field data is virtually impossible. The main 
difficulty is that different principals may choose different tournament structures in different 
environments (where the distribution of workers’ abilities may not be comparable). Hence, I use 
experiments to test whether the designer chooses the optimal tournament consistent with my 
theoretical predictions as the contestants’ abilities vary. I use a simple structure for the 
experiment: two institutions (single-prize or parallel tournament) are crossed with two cost 
differences (large or small) between the types. I vary the cost difference by keeping the high-
ability agents’ marginal cost level identical and changing low-ability agents’ cost levels across 
the treatments. In additional treatments, I also change (high) tournament’s prizes in the parallel 
and single-prize tournaments.  
 Three main insights emerge from the experiments. First, the designer obtains a significantly 
higher profit in the parallel tournament than in the single-prize tournament when types differ 
greatly from each other. The designer obtains a significantly higher profit in the single-prize 
tournament than in the parallel tournament when types are similar. These results support the 
theoretical predictions for the designer’s profit. 
  Second, I find that high-ability agents underparticipate and low-ability agents 
overparticipate in the high-prize tournament relative to the equilibrium prediction. I conjecture 
that there are two possible reasons underlying this observation: One is that an agent’s belief about 
winning the high tournament’s prize may change as a response to his opponent’s ability. A high-
ability (low-ability) agent may believe less (more) that he can win the high tournament’s prize 
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and hence he may become less (more) competitive, if his opponent has a closer ability (marginal 
cost of effort) to his. The other possible explanation is that agents’ risk aversion may affect their 
tournament selection behavior. The best response of each agent can change depending on how 
risk averse or risk loving he is. 
 Finally, the percentage of subjects choosing the equilibrium effort depends on the number 
of contestants in the chosen tournament. In particular, when there is just one person in the 
tournament, equilibrium effort is frequently chosen in all treatments. When there are two people 
in the tournament, observed equilibrium effort percentages are lower. The marginal effect of 
being together with an opponent on the observed equilibrium is smaller in the low-prize 
tournament (-0.14) than in the high-prize tournament (-0.07).  
 The vast majority of the contest literature focuses on single-prize tournaments29 (see Falk 
and Fehr, 2003 and Irlenbusch, 2005 for a literature review), which elicit the highest total effort 
when contestants are homogenous (Lazear and Rosen, 1981; Rosen, 1986; Prendergast, 1999) but 
not when the contestants are heterogeneous (Schotter and Weigelt, 1992; Harbring et al., 2007). 
This paper analyzes whether the tournament-selection decision increases the designer’s profit 
compared to the single-prize tournament (in which there is no selection decision) when the 
contestants are heterogeneous. In particular, it contributes primarily to the theoretical and 
experimental literature on tournaments with endogenous entry.  
The theoretical literature on tournament selection begins with Lazear and Rosen (1981). 
In their paper, they consider agents’ self-selection into high prize and low-prize tournaments with 
respect to their abilities, as a solution to the decrease-in-performance problem when agents are 
heterogeneous. According to their model, an employer cannot obtain agent self-selection into 
                                                     
29 There are other tournament designs in the literature, such as multistage elimination tournaments (Altman, 
Folk, and Wibral, 2010; Groh et. al., 2012; Rosen, 1986; and Sheremeta, 2010) and single tournaments with 
multiple prizes (Moldavunu and Sela, 2001; Muller and Schotter, 2010; and Sheremeta, 2011); however, 
WTA is the simplest and most common. 
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tournaments with respect to their abilities, and therefore, he elicits efforts inefficiently. Their 
model differs from the model used in this paper in many aspects. For example, they define 
performance as the sum of an agent’s effort and luck, as in rank-order tournaments. I define 
performance solely as the effort, as in all-pay auction models. They assume that the employer 
gets zero profit from the tournament, but I allow the employer to make a profit.  
Later, O’Keeffe et al. (1984) show that an employer can achieve agent self-selection into 
tournaments with respect to their abilities by changing monitoring precision (derivative of the 
winning probability in the high-prize and low-prize tournaments) and prize spread with a model 
based on the rank-order tournament.30 They assume that the agent believes his opponent in the 
high-prize contest has high ability and in the low-prize contest has low ability. I demonstrate that 
without such an assumption it is possible to achieve agent self-selection with appropriate prize 
levels in an all-pay auction set up.  
Last, Leuven et al. (2011) compare total effort elicited in parallel tournaments and single-
prize tournaments with a Tullock (1980) tournament when agents are heterogeneous. They show 
theoretically that single-prize tournaments always deliver higher total effort than parallel 
tournaments. Here, instead of total effort, I focus on a designer’s profit, i.e., the difference 
between expected total effort and the expected given prize in a deterministic contest. 
Furthermore, my model differs from theirs in the determination of the WTA prizes: my model 
uses the optimal prize in the sense that the prize incentivizes both types of agents while 
maximizing the employer’s profit; their model sets the WTA prize simply as the sum of the prizes 
in the parallel tournament. These key differences in tournament modeling account for the 
different theoretical expectations between my work and previous literature. Here, I predict 
theoretically and verify experimentally that the superiority of a tournament mechanism depends 
on the difference between contestants’ abilities. 
                                                     
30 They change these to guarantee global and local incentives for both types of workers. 
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There are three groups of experimental studies with endogenous entry in tournaments: 
One deals with contest entry decisions in which the outside option is a fixed wage31 (Fullerton et 
al., 1999; Anderson and Stafford, 2003; Morgan et al., 2012). The second studies contest entry 
decisions in which the outside option is piece rate (Eriksson et al., 2009; Dohmen and Folk, 2011; 
Bartling et al., 2009; Balafautas et al., 2012; and Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007), and the third 
group studies contest entry decisions among alternative contests (Vandegrift, 2007; Cason et al., 
2010). Because my study also deals with a contestant’s decision between two tournament designs, 
I focus on the third group. In Vandegrift et al. (2007), subjects choose between piece-rate, single-
prize and multiple-prize lottery contests. Holding total payments constant across contests, they 
find that effort is higher in the single-prize contest than in the multi prize contest. However, entry 
rates into the single-prize contest as well as subject quality are found to be lower than those into 
and of the multi prize contest. Cason et al. (2010) test performance and entry decisions under 
proportional-prize and WTA tournaments when agents’ abilities differ. They find that a 
proportional-prize contest attracts more entrants and generates more aggregate effort than a WTA 
contest. Here, I compare agents’ behavior with two different tournament designs and I find that 
contestant heterogeneity determines whether the designer benefits more from a single-prize or 
parallel tournament. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the basic theoretical background. 
Section 3 describes the experimental design. Sections 4 through 6 present aggregate and 
individual experimental results. Section 7 concludes and discusses the results. 
3.2 Theoretical Framework 
I consider an environment in which an employer has two workers with different abilities. There 
are two possible ability levels for each worker. A worker can be of high ability (good type) with 
probability 0.5 and of low ability (bad type) with probability 0.5. Workers’ types are independent 
                                                     
31 In a contest-entry decision, fixed wage can be thought as zero. 
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of each other and are determined by the marginal cost of effort. Bad types have a high marginal 
cost of effort,      , and good types have a low marginal cost of effort,      ;       
 . Knowing workers’ potential types (but not their realized types) the employer offers either a 
single-prize tournament (section 2.1) or two parallel tournaments with different prizes (section 
2.2). In the single-prize tournament, knowing only his own type and the value of the prize, each 
worker chooses either    or   , where      .
32 Similarly, in the parallel tournaments, knowing 
only his own type and the values of the prizes, each worker first chooses between tournaments, 
then chooses either    or   . In both tournaments, whether a worker i wins the prize or not, he 
pays his cost of effort,     , where    is the marginal cost of effort (either    or   ) and    is the 
chosen effort (either    or   ). 
In the single-prize tournament, the worker exerting the higher effort wins the tournament 
prize and the worker exerting the lower effort gets nothing.33 If both choose the same effort level, 
the prize is divided between two contestants. Here, I assume that workers are risk neutral. In 
particular, a worker’s payoff is the difference between the tournament’s prize and his cost of 
effort if he wins the prize and only the cost of his effort if he does not win the prize. On the other 
hand, a risk-neutral employer’s profit is the difference between the expected elicited total effort 
and the expected total given prize(s). I assume that effort equals the output of a worker34 and the 
price of an output is 1. The employer’s revenue is the sum of the workers’ output levels. I first 
look at workers’ behavior when the employer chooses to organize a single-prize tournament. 
                                                     
32 Throughout the paper, I limit heterogeneity for the effort levels; instead I use heterogeneity for types, i.e., 
the marginal cost of efforts. 
33 The payoffs are calculated similarly when two agents choose the same tournament in the parallel-
tournament setting. 
34 Hence the set up is similar to all pay auction models. 
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3.2.1 Single-Prize Tournament 
In the single-prize tournament, an employer offers a tournament with a prize   to incentivize 
each worker. Knowing only his own ability, each worker chooses either    or    to exert. The 
strategy of each worker is the probability of choosing   , i.e.,          , where i denotes the 
worker’s type (a good type ( ) or a bad type ( )). The expected utilities of a good type from 
exerting    and    are as follows: 
   (  (
 
 
)  (    )( ))     (  (
 
 
)  (    )( ))          
   (  ( )  (    ) (
 
 
))     (  ( )  (    ) (
 
 
))      . 
The expected utility of exerting    is greater than the expected utility of exerting    for a good 
type if 
(
 
 
   (     ))   . 
There are three potential equilibrium structures to consider: 1) Pooling equilibrium, where 
either both types exert    (appendix 1, Case 1) or both types exert    (appendix 1, Case 2); 2) 
Separating equilibrium, where either good types exert    and bad types exert     (appendix 1, 
Case 3) or good types exert    and bad types exert   ; and 3) Semi-pooling equilibrium where 
good types exert    and bad types mix between    and    (appendix 1, Case 4), or good types mix 
between    and    and bad types exert    (appendix 1, Case 4), or both types mix between    and 
  .
35  
An employer’s aim is to maximize his profit by providing a minimal prize and eliciting 
maximal effort levels from the workers. Hence, knowing the potential marginal cost level of the 
                                                     
35 The equilibrium structures that are not discussed in appendix 1 are not equilibria due to higher marginal 
cost levels of bad types. 
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workers (but not their realized types), and with predetermined    and   , an employer chooses the 
lowest   that satisfies the incentive compatibility (           ) and individual rationality 
(           ) conditions for both types. For instance, in order to elicit    from both types 
(appendix 1, Case 1), an employer sets the minimum prize solving the following linear program: 
   
{ }
{     } 
                                 subject to 
i) 
 
 
   (     )   ,  
ii) 
 
 
   (     )   , 
iii) 
 
 
        , 
iv) 
 
 
       . 
The first two conditions state the incentive compatibility and the last two conditions state 
the individual rationality constraints for bad and good types respectively. Similarly he can set 
optimal prizes for another equilibrium by using that equilibrium’s constraints discussed in 
appendix 1. To have both types exert    in the tournament, there is a constraint over the 
difference between    and    as explained in Proposition 1.  
Proposition 1 (Constraint on Effort Difference for Pooling on   ): In the single-prize 
tournament, if the prize is high enough and       , both types will exert    in equilibrium. 
Proof: See appendix 3.  
The condition over the effort levels comes with the incentive compatibility and individual 
rationality constraints for bad types. Bad types exert    and get a positive expected payoff only if 
the difference between the effort levels is high enough; otherwise they exert   . However, when 
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bad types exert   , the employer needs to give a high prize (hence he makes less profit) to 
guarantee positive expected utilities for bad types.36  
3.2.2 Parallel Tournament  
In the parallel tournament, the employer offers two tournaments with different prizes to 
incentivize each worker. The high-prize tournament gives a high prize,  , to its winner; the low-
prize tournament gives a low prize,  , to its winner, i.e.,    . Knowing only his own type and 
the prizes, each worker is asked to participate in one of two tournaments. Then, tournament 
choices become public information and each worker chooses to exert    or    where      . If 
the workers choose different tournaments (hence they are by themselves in a tournament), 
regardless of the effort they exert, they win the tournament’s prize. If both workers choose the 
same tournament, their payoffs are calculated similarly to the single-prize case. 
               The strategy of each worker is (      
     
 )                       , where i denotes the 
worker’s type (a good type ( ) or a bad type ( ));    is the probability of the worker i choosing 
the high-prize tournament; and    
  and    
  are the probabilities of choosing    for a worker i 
when he is in the high-prize and low-prize tournaments, respectively.37  
               I start my equilibrium analysis by looking at workers’ optimal decisions in the 
subgames, i.e., their effort choices. When a worker is by himself38 in a given tournament he wins 
the chosen tournament’s prize either he exerts    or   . To minimize his cost of effort he chooses 
  .  
                                                     
36 When the difference between the effort levels is really high, the incentive-compatibility conditions to 
exert a low effort are satisfied, along with the individual-rationality condition for bad types, as opposed to 
the situation in Proposition 1. In that case, an employer can incentivize both types with a lower prize and 
my claim about the profit comparison between parallel and single-prize tournaments may not hold. 
37 Since the probability of choosing high effort when the agent by himself in the tournament is always 0, I 
did not list this among the other strategies.  
38 Workers learn the number of people in a tournament before choosing an effort level and know that they 
will win the tournament prize when they are alone in a tournament. 
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               When two workers choose the same tournament, there are 81 cases to consider in the 
subgames in both (the high-prize and low-prize) tournaments for good types and bad types (For 
four conditions (type x tournament), there are 3 cases to consider with a total of 3
4
 = 81). Similar 
to the single-prize case, I can eliminate some subgame strategies due to higher marginal cost of 
effort for bad types (after this elimination the cases to consider become 25) and higher prize in 
the high tournament (after this elimination the cases to consider become 9). Additionally, I only 
look at the pure-strategy effort choices to simplify the calculations and have 6 cases to consider 
given the types’ tournament choices.  
              One can write expected utility of a worker for exerting    or    in the high-prize and 
low-prize tournaments similarly to the expected utilities of his effort choices in the single-prize 
tournament. Workers’ optimal effort choices in the tournaments depend on the chosen 
tournament’s prize, effort difference, and their marginal cost of effort. For instance, conditions of 
a good type exerting    in both high-prize and low-prize tournaments are as follows respectively:  
(
 
 
   (     ))    and (
 
 
   (     ))   . 
After the optimal effort choices, I consider the conditions for the following equilibrium 
behavior for tournament selection:  1) Pooling: both types enter the high-prize tournament or both 
types enter the low-prize tournament. 2) Separating equilibrium: good types enter the high-prize 
tournament and bad types enter the low-prize tournament or good types enter the low-prize 
tournament and bad types enter the high-prize tournament. 3) Semi-pooling: good types enter the 
high-prize tournament and bad types mix between the tournaments, or good types mix between 
the tournaments and bad types enter the low-prize tournament, or both types mix between the 
tournaments. The equilibrium structures that are not discussed in appendix 2 are not equilibria 
due to different prize values in the tournaments. I mostly focused on the pure tournament-
selection strategies. Since I have a treatment in the experiment when bad types are mixing, I also 
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look at the conditions in which good types enter the high-prize tournament and bad types mix 
between the tournaments. 
First, I look at the conditions for an equilibrium by which it is possible to create more 
homogeneous groups for the contests, i.e., conditions for perfect sorting and reverse sorting. 
Proposition 3 (Separating Equilibrium for the Tournament Choice):  
(i) Good types enter the high-prize tournament and bad types enter the low-prize 
tournament only if the ratio of high-prize to low-prize is in the interval  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
. 
(ii) Reverse sorting, where good types enter the low-prize tournament and bad types 
enter the high-prize tournament, never occurs. 
Proof: See appendix 2, Case 2 for (i) and appendix 2, Case 4 for (ii). 
Good types always enter the high-prize tournament and exert pure equilibrium effort 
strategies if the prize ratio of the tournaments is high enough (specifically 
 
 
 
 
 
). Bad types 
always enter the low-prize tournament and exert pure equilibrium effort strategies if the prize 
ratio of the tournaments is low enough (specifically 
 
 
 
 
 
). If the prize ratio is below the lower 
bound, there is not much difference in terms of payoffs between the high- and low-prize 
tournaments for both types; if the prize ratio is above the upper bound, entering the high-prize 
tournament becomes more profitable for bad types. When both types are choosing the same effort 
levels in both tournaments, both types want to be in the high-prize tournament. Thus, there is no 
perfect sorting for tournament choices under pooling of effort choices. Reverse sorting never 
occurs because good types always find entering the high-prize tournament more profitable.  
Next, I look at the conditions for a pooling equilibrium in which both types enter the 
high-prize or low-prize tournaments.  
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Proposition 4 (Pooling Equilibrium for the Tournament Choice):  
(i) Pooling where both types enter the high-prize tournament occurs only when the high 
prize to low prize ratio is high enough. 
(ii) Pooling where both types enter the low-prize tournament never occurs. 
Proof: See appendix 2, Case 1 for (i) and appendix 2, Case 5 for (ii). 
The threshold for prize ratio that makes bad types enter the high-prize tournament in the 
equilibrium in (i) changes according to bad types’ optimal effort choices in the subgames. For 
instance, when both types are pooling for their effort choices in both tournaments, bad types enter 
the high-prize tournament if the prize ratio is higher than 2 (Case 1.1, Case 1.6). If bad types exert 
   in the low-prize tournament while exerting    in the high-prize tournament, bad types enter the 
high-prize tournament when the prize ratio is higher than 3 (Case 1.2, Case 1.4). If bad types 
exert    in both tournaments while good types exerting    in the high-prize tournament, bad types 
enter the high-prize tournament when the prize ratio is higher than 4 (Case 1.3, Case 1.5). There 
is no equilibrium in which both types enter the low-prize tournament because good types always 
obtain higher gains in the high-prize tournament.  
If an employer increases the high tournament’s prize, the expected payoff of a bad type 
by entering the high tournament increases. Hence, he enters the high tournament with a higher 
probability (appendix 2, Case 3).  
After finding equilibrium conditions for the workers, I need to find the minimum prize 
for the employer to maximize his profit. For instance, for the equilibrium in which types self-
select into the tournaments according to their abilities and separate for effort levels, the employer 
sets the prizes to maximize his profit as follows: 
   
{   }
{    (     )      (     )     (    (   ))} 
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                                 subject to 
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vii)    (      )     (
 
 
     )   , 
viii)    (      )     (
 
 
     )   . 
The first two inequalities state incentive compatibility conditions for good types to exert 
   in the high-prize and low-prize tournaments respectively, the third and fourth inequalities state 
incentive compatibility conditions for bad types to exert    in the high-prize and low-prize 
tournaments respectively, the fifth and sixth inequalities state incentive compatibility conditions 
for good types to enter the high-prize and bad types to enter the low-prize tournaments 
respectively, and the last two conditions state individual rationality conditions for good and bad 
types when they self-select into the tournaments according to their abilities and choose    and    
respectively, in the chosen tournaments. The employer sets optimal prizes for other potential 
equilibria as discussed in appendix 2 and implements the equilibrium that maximizes his profit.  
3.3 Experimental Design and Procedures 
I implemented a 2 x 2 design. Namely, I varied the institution (single-prize or parallel 
tournament) and the cost difference between the types (large or small). I used “between-“ subject 
design for the institution treatments and “within-“ subject design for the cost difference 
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treatments. To vary the cost difference, I kept the good type’s marginal cost level (0.4) identical 
and changed bad types’ cost levels across the treatments. To have large (small) cost difference 
between the types I chose bad types’ cost level as 1 (0.5). In additional treatments, I also changed 
prizes in the parallel (high prize) and single prize-tournaments. In both between- and within-
subject treatments, I used the same effort levels: 35 for    and 13 for   .  
 Parallel Tournament Single-Prize Tournament 
(High) Prize Optimal  Above Optimal Optimal  Optimal Below Optimal 
Cost Difference Large  Small Large Small Large Small Large 
Bad Type’s Cost Level 1 0.5 1 0.5 1 0.5 1 
Good Type’s Cost Level 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 
(High) Prize 25 25 42 42 70 36 42 
Low Prize 18 18 18 18 --        --  -- 
Table 3.1: Treatments 
 Now, I will explain what theory predicts about workers’ behavior and the employer’s profit 
in these treatments. When the cost difference between the types is “large”, good and bad types 
self-select into the tournaments according to their abilities and separate in effort levels with the 
optimal high and low prizes as given in the first column of Table 3.1 (The parameters of this 
treatment satisfy the conditions of the equilibrium corresponding to Case 2.3 in appendix 2). I 
compare the profits obtained in this treatment with the profits obtained in the “large” cost-
difference treatment of the single-prize tournament (last column in Table 3.1).39 The employer sets 
a different prize for the single-prize tournament than the sum of prizes in the parallel tournament. 
Particularly, when the cost difference between the types is large, he uses a greater prize in the 
single-prize tournament than the sum of high and low prizes in the parallel tournament. This 
stems from the fact that an employer needs to give a really high prize to motivate both types to 
exert    in the single-prize tournament (The parameters of the treatment in the single-prize 
tournament with ‘large’ cost difference satisfy the conditions of the equilibrium corresponding to 
Case 1 in appendix 1). As shown in the second row of Table 3.2, when the cost difference between 
                                                     
39 When the prize is optimal, treatment is specified just by the cost difference.  
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the workers is “large,” in equilibrium the employer obtains higher profits in the parallel 
tournament than in the single-prize tournament.  
 When the cost difference between the types is “small,” good and bad types self-select into 
the tournaments and separate in effort levels with optimal high and low prizes as given in the 
second column of Table 3.1 (The parameters of this treatment satisfy the conditions of the 
equilibrium corresponding to Case 2.2 in appendix 2).40 I compare the profits obtained in this 
treatment with the profits obtained in the ‘small’ cost-difference treatment of the single-prize 
tournament (the fifth column in Table 3.1). The employer sets a lower prize in the single-prize 
tournament than the sum of prizes in the parallel tournament when the cost difference between 
the types is “small.” (The parameters of the treatment in the single-prize tournament with “small” 
cost difference satisfy the conditions of the equilibrium corresponding to Case 1 in appendix 1).41 
As shown in the second row of Table 3.2, when the cost difference between the workers is 
“small,” in equilibrium the employer obtains a lower profit in the parallel tournament than in the 
single-prize tournament. 
 I also have treatments by increasing the high prize in the parallel tournament. If the high 
prize is above optimal and cost difference is “large,” good types enter the high-prize tournament 
and bad types enter the high-prize tournament with 0.5 probability. Good types exert    while 
bad types exerting    in both tournaments. (The parameters of this treatment satisfy the conditions 
                                                     
40 Both in the treatments with “small” and “large” cost differences, the designer can make higher profit if he 
implements an equilibrium in which both types exert low effort in the low-prize tournament. In this way, 
both low-prize and high-prize tournaments will be lower and the expected total elicited effort will be the 
same. However, with these optimal prizes the incentives for both types to choose equilibrium behavior 
(especially for tournament choice) will be lower. Hence, I chose the prizes in a way that they do not change 
the main theoretical message of the paper but gives higher incentives to the agents to choose the right 
tournament.  
41 The same profit can be obtained under parallel tournament if in equilibrium when both types enter the 
high-prize tournament and choose low effort in the low-prize tournament. The reason is that there will not 
be a constraint for the low prize, i.e., the employer can set 0 for it. Then parallel tournament will turn out a 
single-prize tournament. 
47 
 
of the equilibrium corresponding to Case 3.3 in appendix 2).42 This treatment theoretically 
generates a lower profit than the “large” cost difference treatment of the parallel tournament with 
optimal prizes, as shown in the second row of Table 3.2.  
 If the high prize is above optimal and cost difference is “small,” good types enter the high-
prize tournament with probability 1 and bad types enter the high-prize tournament with 
probability 0.61. Good types exert    in both tournaments whereas bad types exert    in the low-
prize tournament and    in the high-prize tournament. (The parameters of this treatment satisfy 
the conditions of the equilibrium corresponding to Case 3.2 in appendix 2). This treatment 
generates a higher profit than the “small” cost difference treatment of the parallel tournament 
with optimal prizes, as shown in the second row of Table 3.2. 
 I have a treatment with the below optimal prize in the single-prize tournament (the same 
prize with the high prize of above optimal treatment in the parallel tournament) to test the effect 
of tournament-selection stage on agents’ effort choices.43 Such a stage may affect a subject’s 
belief about the opponent’s type, hence the subject’s effort choice. A summary of all treatments is 
shown in Table 3.1. 
Subjects were recruited by e-mail using the Social Science Experimental Laboratory 
database, which consists of graduate and undergraduate students at the California Institute of 
Technology. The experiment was computerized using z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007). In total 88 
subjects participated in the experiment. Each subject participated only once, either in a single-
prize or in a parallel tournament. In the experiment, there were nine sessions: five sessions of the 
                                                     
42 The other strategies with mixing for the tournaments are not feasible, i.e., there is no equilibrium when 
both types are mixing between the tournaments or when good types are mixing between the tournaments, 
bad types enter the low-prize tournament. 
43 The parameters of the treatment with a “below optimal” prize in the single-prize tournament satisfy the 
conditions of equilibrium in Case 3, in appendix 1 besides individual rationality constraints for bad types. 
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single-prize and four sessions of the parallel treatments.44 Each session consisted of 40 periods, 
with 10 periods of each treatment.45 In each period of the parallel (single-prize) sessions, one of 
four (three) treatments was randomly selected.46 Subjects were told that in every period the (high) 
prize, bad type’s cost level, or both could change. Throughout the experiment, payoffs were 
described in terms of “points.” Twenty points corresponded to one dollar. Subjects were paid the 
sum of their periods’ earnings at the end of the experiment. Each session lasted about an hour and 
subjects earned $18.57 on average, including a $5 participation fee.  
The experiments replicated the model described in Section 2. In the instructions, a neutral 
language was used: Match corresponded to the opponent, task corresponded to tournament, 
decision level corresponded to effort, cost multiplier corresponded to a subject’s ability/type, 
decision cost corresponded to a subject’s disutility of effort, and payment corresponded to prize. 
Now I will describe the single-prize and parallel tournament sessions in more detail. 
 In the single-prize sessions,47 at the beginning of each period each subject was assigned a 
“cost multiplier.” Each cost multiplier was randomly drawn from {     } (in the treatments 
where the cost difference between the types is large) or from {       } (in the treatments where 
the cost difference between the types is small) in every period. After subjects were informed only 
about their cost multipliers, they simultaneously chose between two decision levels: 35 or 13. 
Subjects were informed that by choosing a decision level they would incur a “decision cost.”48 
This decision cost was explained verbally and in the form of a table shown on their screen. After 
                                                     
44 The number of subjects in a session varied from session to session. In particular, in three of the single-
prize sessions there were 10 subjects, in one of them there were 6 subjects, and in one of them there were 8 
subjects. In three of parallel-tournament sessions, there were 10 subjects, and in one of them there were 14 
subjects. 
45 The treatment with a “below optimal” prize in the single-prize tournament in table 3.1 was repeated 20 
times in order to make subjects really think about the effort levels. With the parameters used in the other 
treatments of the single-prize tournament, they may have got bored by always choosing the high effort 
level. 
46 The order of treatments in parallel tournaments (or in single-prize tournaments) is the same across the 
sessions. These orders can be found at appendix 6 of this chapter. 
47 The instructions for this session can be found at appendix 5 of this chapter. 
48 Decision cost is the multiplication of cost multiplier and decision level. 
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each subject had chosen her decision level, the decision levels of the matched two subjects were 
compared. The player with the higher decision level received a “payment” for that particular 
period, whereas her partner received no payment. If both match members chose the same decision 
level, the period payment was divided between the two members. It was also explained and 
emphasized that decision costs would be subtracted whether or not a subject had won. This 
implied that subjects could lose money for some periods.  
 Similarly, in the parallel sessions,49 subjects were assigned a cost multiplier either from 
{     } or from {       } in each period. After subjects were informed only about their cost 
multipliers, they simultaneously chose between two task choices: Task A or Task B. After the 
task choice, they were shown whether their opponents chose the same task or not. Then, they 
were asked to choose either 35 or 13 as their decision levels. While making this choice, they saw 
the cost table representing potential costs of their decisions. After each subject had chosen her 
decision level, the decision levels of the matched two subjects who performed the same task were 
compared. The player with the higher decision level received a “payment” for the task in that 
particular period; her opponent received no payment. If both subjects in a pair choosing the same 
task also chose identical decision level, the payment for that task was divided between them. If 
the subjects in a pair chose different tasks, they received their task payments regardless of the 
decision level they chose. This was explained during the instructions. Moreover, subjects knew 
that their decision costs would be subtracted whether or not they won the tournament.  
 In all sessions, after each period, subjects saw a feedback screen. In the single-prize 
sessions, subjects were informed whether their decision level was higher or lower than, or 
coincided with, their opponents’ decision levels; whether they won the period payment or not; 
and what their period payoffs were. Furthermore, the screen reiterated a subject’s cost multiplier 
and decision level. In the parallel sessions, in addition to the feedbacks given in the single-prize 
                                                     
49 Instructions for this session can be found at appendix 6 of this chapter. 
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tournaments, subjects were informed about whether they were alone or with their opponents in 
the task they chose.  
3.4 Profit 
I start by comparing an employer’s profit from an individual in the parallel and single-prize 
tournaments. In Table 3.2, the first row gives means of profits obtained from a person in the 
experiment and the second row gives expected profits from a person in equilibrium. In all 
treatments, each subject plays the same treatment 10 times, resulting in 440 observations. In all 
statistical tests, standard errors are clustered by subjects within the same treatment.50 
Tournament Parallel  Single-prize 
 (High) Prize Optimal Above Optimal Optimal Optimal 
Cost Difference 
 
Large Small Large Small Large Small 
Mean 
Equilibrium 
3.49  
2.38 
4.88 
2.38 
-0.91 
-2.38 
5.56 
3.89 
-1.00 
  0.00 
15.30 
17.00 
Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics for Profit Levels. 
First, I compare the profits obtained in the parallel tournament with the profits obtained 
in the single-prize tournament when the cost difference is “large.” I find that the mean profit 
(with the described treatment parameters) in the parallel tournament is higher than the mean profit 
in the single-prize tournament at the 1% significance level (Wilcoxon p-value = 0.0000). Then, I 
compare the profits obtained in the parallel tournament with the profits obtained in the single-
prize tournament when the cost difference is “small.” I find that the mean profit (with described 
treatment parameters) in the parallel tournament is lower than the mean profit in the single-prize 
tournament at the 1% significance level (Wilcoxon p-value = 0.0000). 
Furthermore, I test how an increase in the high tournament’s prize in the parallel 
tournament affects the employer’s profit. When the cost difference between the types is ‘large’, I 
                                                     
50 Decision levels chosen by the same subject cannot be considered as an independent observation. 
51 
 
find that the mean profit obtained in the treatment with the “optimal” high prize is significantly 
higher than the mean profit obtained in the treatment with the “above optimal” high prize 
(Wilcoxon p-value = 0.0003). However, when the cost difference between the types is “small,” I 
find that the mean profits obtained in the parallel tournament with the “optimal” and “above 
optimal” high prize treatments are not significantly different (Wilcoxon p-value = 0.48).  
These statistical results, which are in line with the theory, tell us that an employer prefers 
a parallel tournament to a single-prize tournament when the cost difference between the types is 
large. However, he prefers a single-prize tournament to a parallel tournament when the cost 
difference between the types is small. In any case (with large or small cost difference between the 
types), the employer does not prefer increasing the high prize in the parallel tournament because 
of the following two reasons: 1) When the cost difference between the types is small, the 
employer always obtains a significantly lower profit in the parallel tournament (either in the 
optimal prize or above optimal prize treatment) than in the single-prize tournament. 2) When the 
cost difference between the types is large, the employer obtains a significantly higher profit in the 
parallel tournament with the ‘optimal’ high prize treatment than with the ‘above optimal’ high 
prize treatment. 
3.5 Tournament and Effort Choices 
3.5.1 Aggregate Data 
For tournament-selection behavior, I check how frequently subjects choose the high-prize 
tournament over all periods of a treatment when they are good or bad types.51 As evident in the 
first row of Table 3.3 and the equilibrium percentages in parentheses, good types selected the 
                                                     
51 As evident from table 3.4, experience does not play a significant role in the tournament choice but in the 
equilibrium effort choice. When I separate the treatments into the groups of ten, I realized that most of the 
learning occurs in the first two periods. If the aggregate data is calculated by excluding the first two 
repetition of each treatment, observed equilibrium effort percentages are higher. For instance, by excluding 
the first two repetition of each treatment observed equilibrium effort increases from 76% to 81% in the OL 
treatment, from 72% to 79% in the OS treatment, or from 52% to 61% in the AOL treatment. 
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high-prize tournament significantly less often than predicted by the equilibrium. However, bad 
types selected the high-prize tournament significantly more often than predicted by the 
equilibrium in all treatments, except in the AOL treatment of parallel tournament.52  
The difference between the observed and equilibrium tournament selection behavior may 
stem from two reasons. The first may be risk aversion. The best response of each agent can 
change depending on how risk averse or risk loving she is. The second may be that an agent’s 
belief of winning the high tournament’s prize changes as the marginal cost difference between the 
types changes. The closer difference in marginal cost levels of a bad type and a good type, the 
more a bad type can believe that he can win the high-tournament’s prize.53  
 
High Prize Optimal Above Optimal 
Cost Difference Large (OL) Small (OS) Large (AOL) Small (AOS) 
Subjects/Types Good Bad Good Bad Good Bad Good Bad 
Tournament   
Selection 
All  
(Equilibrium) 
76 
(100) 
32 
(0) 
70 
(100) 
50 
(0) 
87 
(100) 
47 
(50) 
87 
(100) 
80 
(61) 
Effort (n = 2) All 81 76 86 72 93 52 96 93 
Table 3.3: Average High-Prize Tournament-Selection and Effort Percentages (%) in Parallel Tournaments 
(Equilibrium high-prize tournament-selection percentages (%) are given in parentheses) 
Then, I check subjects’ effort behavior at the sub-games (at the chosen tournament) when 
they are good or bad types across the treatments.54 I separately analyze subjects’ behavior when 
they are by themselves or together with their opponents in the tournament. When there is just one 
person in the tournament, observed equilibrium effort percentages are quite high in all treatments 
                                                     
52 For significance test, one-sample t-test is used.  
53 In the treatments, I chose the same optimal prizes when the cost difference is large and small, the reader 
may think that lower prizes would be enough when the cost difference between the types is small. Further, 
he may think that choosing the prizes that high in the “small” cost difference treatment may lead 
tournament selection mistakes. However, the reader should note that these same prizes in the treatments 
lead types to exert different optimal effort choices in the tournaments. If the subgame behavior of both 
types were the same, when the cost difference was small, the designer would incentivize both types to self-
select in to the tournaments with lower low- and high-tournament’s prizes. 
54 I check whether the agent’s effort decision is according to the subgame equilibrium of that treatment or 
not, even if the tournament-selection decision is not according to the equilibrium prediction. 
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and not significantly different from the equilibrium predictions. When there are two people in the 
tournament, observed equilibrium effort percentages are significantly below the equilibrium 
predictions as evident in the second row of Table 3.3. The most noticeable observation in the 
Effort row of Table 3.3 belongs to bad types in the AOL (“above optimal” high prize and “large” 
cost difference) treatment of parallel tournament. To understand why the percentage in this 
particular treatment has low equilibrium ratio, I first show the observed equilibrium effort 
percentages in each tournament separately (appendix 4, Table 3.6). As evident from Table 3.5, bad 
types’ behavior did not accord to the sub-game Nash equilibrium in this treatment when they 
were in the high-prize tournament (They chose    with 0.68 probability and    with probability 
0.32 even though they should have chosen    with probability 1). Then I calculate the expected 
payoffs with the realized frequencies in the experiment (appendix 4, Table 3.7). One can observe 
from Table 3.6, the expected payoff difference by exerting    and    for bad types is low (0.7) in 
the treatment with the “above optimal” high prize and “large” cost difference. To understand 
whether there is a correlation between the percentage of observed equilibrium effort and the 
expected payoff difference between the effort choices (the magnitudes of incentives), I look at the 
correlation coefficient. I find the correlation to be 0.71, i.e., subjects’ response to magnitudes of 
incentives for effort levels is high. 
Similarly, for the single-prize sessions, I look at the observed equilibrium effort 
percentage of the subjects when they are good or bad types across the treatments. In all treatments 
of the single-prize sessions, all types exerted equilibrium effort more than 90% of the time, but 
bad types in the treatment with the ‘below optimal’ prize exerted equilibrium effort only 52% of 
the time. To understand why bad types in that treatment were outliers, I follow a similar strategy 
to the parallel tournament case, i.e., considering the expected payoff for each type (good or bad) 
from exerting    and   . The expected payoff difference between the effort choices is the closest 
to 0 for bad types in the treatment with the “below optimal” prize and it is much higher in other 
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treatments. Again, one can conclude that subjects highly respond to magnitudes of incentives for 
effort levels in the single-prize tournament.  
To understand the effect of the tournament-selection decision prior to the effort choice on 
subjects’ effort choices, I use the same prize in one of the single-prize sessions (the treatment 
with the “below optimal” prize) and in one of the high-tournaments of the parallel sessions (the 
treatment with the “above optimal” high prize). I observe high equilibrium effort frequencies for 
good types in the single-prize and in the parallel tournament treatments (97% and 99%, 
respectively). However, for bad types, I observe low equilibrium effort frequencies in both 
treatments (54% and 32%, respectively). The much lower equilibrium behavior for the bad types 
in the parallel tournament may stem from the fact that a bad type expects    from his opponent in 
the high-prize tournament and as a response he does indeed exert   . However, for that treatment, 
the bad type’s best response should be to choose    regardless of whether he is in the high-prize 
or low-prize tournament. 
3.5.2 Individual Analysis 
To uncover the determinants of tournament selection and to test for learning, I estimate a discrete 
choice model on each individual’s decision to choose high-prize tournament as a function of 
several explanatory variables. Low-cost variable takes the value 1 when the subject is a good 
type, Female variable takes the value 1 when the subject is female, Experience variable takes the 
value 1 for the last 20 periods of a session, Above-optimal variable takes the value 1 when the 
high-tournament’s prize is above optimal, small-cost difference variable takes the value 1 when 
the cost difference between good and bad types is small. Table 3.4 corresponds to the marginal 
effect of the estimation (where standard errors are clustered by subjects). 
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Condition Entry into high-prize tournament 
Low-cost 0.29*** (0.04) 
Female 0.13** (0.06) 
Experience 0.01 (0.03) 
Above-optimal 0.14*** (0.04) 
Small-cost difference 0.07* (0.04) 
Above Optimal*Small cost difference 0.13*** (0.04) 
Pseduo-Rsquared 
Observations 
0.13 
1760 
Table 3.4: Probit Estimation for Entering the High-Prize Tournament 
Several insights come out of the tournament-entry estimation. First, and in line with the 
theoretical predictions, being a good type increases the probability of entry into the high-prize 
tournament. Second, again in line with the theoretical predictions, if the high tournament’s prize 
is above optimal, the probability of entry into the high-prize tournament increases. Third, 
subjects’ behavior did not differ significantly between the first 20 periods and the last 20 periods. 
Fourth, small cost-difference between good and bad types increases the probability of entry into 
the high-prize tournament by 0.07. However, the cost difference between the types should affect 
subjects’ entry decisions only when high tournament’s prize is above optimal. Last, being a 
female increases the probability of entry into the high-prize tournament by 0.13. Different than 
here, Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) analyzed whether gender affects subjects’ choices between 
tournament and piece rate (where there is no risk), and found that men prefer tournaments more 
often than women even though there is no significant performance difference between two.55   
To uncover the determinants of effort behavior in each tournament, I also estimate a 
discrete choice model on each individual’s decision to choose equilibrium effort in the high- and 
                                                     
55 Niederle and Vesterlund’s (2007) tournament environment also differs from mine: In their study, subjects 
knew their competitors’ genders (subjects were in groups of four; two female and two male) whereas in my 
study, subjects did not know their opponents’ genders. In their study, performances were determined via 
real effort task and subjects only knew their own performance when they made a tournament entry choice. 
In my study, performances corresponded to pre-determined effort levels. The tournament environment in 
my study was less uncertain than theirs. In my experiment, each subject not only knew his own ability 
(which affected his effort choice), but also knew the potential ability of his opponent. 
56 
 
low-prize tournaments as a function of some explanatory variables in addition to listed ones 
above: Htn2 variable takes the value 1 when the subject is together with his opponent in the high-
prize tournament and Ltn2 variable takes the value 1 when the subject is together with his 
opponent in the low-prize tournament. Second and third columns of Table 3.5 correspond to the 
marginal effects of these estimations respectively (where standard errors are clustered by 
subjects). 
Condition Equilibrium 
effort in the HT 
Equilibrium 
effort in the LT 
Low-cost 0.08*** (0.02) 0.05*** (0.02) 
Female -0.01 (0.02) -0.03 (0.02) 
Experience 0.08*** (0.02) 0.08*** (0.02) 
Above-optimal 0.01 (0.02) -0.01 (0.02) 
Small-cost difference 0.01 (0.02) -0.00 (0.02) 
Above Optimal*Small cost difference 0.07*** (0.02) 0.06*** (0.02) 
Htn2 -0.07*** (0.02) ----- 
Ltn2 ----- -0.14*** (0.04) 
Pseduo-Rsquared 
Observations 
0.07 
1760 
0.09 
1760 
Robust standard errors are in parenthesis and clustered by subjects. 
* significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level 
Table 3.5: Probit Estimation for Choosing Equilibrium Effort in the High (Low)-Prize Tournaments 
There are several results emerging from equilibrium effort estimations in both 
tournaments. First, in both tournaments, being a good type increases the probability of choosing 
equilibrium effort slightly. Second, there is no effect of gender on equilibrium effort. Third, 
among the treatments only the treatment with above optimal prize and small cost difference 
increases the equilibrium effort behavior slightly in both tournaments. Fourth, in both 
tournaments, being together with the opponent decreases the probability of exerting equilibrium 
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effort. Last, in contrast to learning behavior in tournament selection, subjects learn to exert 
equilibrium effort in both tournaments by time.56  
3.6 Conclusions 
I report results from experiments considering two different tournament designs when workers are 
heterogeneous: a tournament with a single prize and two parallel tournaments with different 
prizes. With respect to outcomes, there are three main insights. First, as predicted by the theory, 
when types differ greatly from each other, the parallel tournament generates higher profits to an 
employer than the single-prize tournament. When types are similar, the single-prize tournament 
generates higher profits. Moreover, by increasing the high prize in the parallel-tournament case, 
an employer cannot increase his profit. Second, good types always under participate and bad 
types over participate in the high-prize tournament. Furthermore, for the tournament-selection 
decision, I find that females enter the high-prize tournament significantly more often than males. 
Third, subjects’ equilibrium effort behavior is related to the number of contestants in the 
tournament, they exert equilibrium effort behavior more frequently when there are fewer subjects 
in a tournament.  
These results are important from a tournament-design perspective. In the real world, there 
is often substantial heterogeneity among workers; hence a tournament should be designed 
considering this fact. Additionally, according to my experimental observations, it may not be 
possible to obtain self-selection into tournaments with respect to ability only, other 
characteristics, such as risk aversion, beliefs, etc., may affect the tournament selection dynamics 
                                                     
56 El-Gamal, McKelvey, and Palfrey (1993) compared two learning models in their paper: one is based on 
reputation building and the other concerns population learning. Learning by reputation building can be 
achieved by playing with a specific opponent over a sequence of moves, then using observations about the 
opponent’s earlier play to make inferences about how the opponent is likely to play in subsequent moves. 
In population learning situations, each subject plays similar games against a sequence of opponents then 
predicts how a randomly selected opponent is likely to act by learned population parameters. My 
experiment is classified under the second model because subjects were re-matched in every period and did 
not play the same game over a period of time (the parameters also changed in every period). 
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of workers. Hence, an employer needs to understand the underlying reasons for workers’ 
tournament choices to better organize tournaments to increase his profits.  
               As I stated earlier, the employer experiences a trade-off by organizing parallel 
tournaments as an alternative to single-prize tournaments because by parallel tournaments an 
employer can increase the homogeneity of contestants in each group, and hence increase his 
profit. At the same time, by these tournaments, the number of contestants in each contest 
decreases and the elicited total effort decreases. My experiment was designed using the simplest 
model, with only two person, two types, and two effort levels, as a first step toward understanding 
this trade-off, and it succeeds in uncovering the basic dynamics of this trade-off. 
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3.7 Appendix 1: Single-Prize Tournament 
Case 1: To have both (good and bad) types pool for   , the expected utility of exerting    should 
be higher than the expected utility of exerting   , i.e.,  
Case 2: To have both types pool for   , the expected utility of exerting    should be higher than 
the expected utility of exerting    for both types.  
Case 3: To have a separating equilibrium in which good types exert    and bad types should 
exert   , the expected utility of exerting    should be higher than the expected utility of exerting 
   for good types and the expected utility of exerting    is higher than the expected utility of 
exerting    for bad types, i.e., 
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Case 4: The necessary condition for a semi-pooling equilibrium in which good types exert    but 
bad types mix between    and    (bad types choose    with probability   ) are:  
The necessary conditions for a semi-pooling equilibrium in which good types mix between    
and    (good types choose    with probability   ) and bad types exert    are: 
 
3.8 Appendix 2: Parallel Tournaments 
Case 1: Pooling for both types to enter the high-prize tournament,        .  
Case 1.1: Both types pool for effort level    in both tournaments: 
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To have both types exert effort levels with the above probabilities, the following constraint 
should hold on the prize:  
 
 
 
To have both types participate in the high-prize tournament, the following constraint should hold 
on the prize:  
To have both types follow the above strategies and gain a positive expected utility, the following 
constraint should hold on the prize: 
Case 1.2: Types separate for effort levels in the low-prize tournament; types pool for effort level 
   in the high-prize tournament: 
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To have both types exert effort levels with the above probabilities, the following constraint 
should hold on the prize:  
 
 
   (     )   , 
 
 
   (     )   , 
 
 
   (     )   , 
 
 
   (     )   , 
    
    
 
 
 
     (     )   , 
 
 
     (     )   . 
    
    
 
 
       , 
 
 
       . 
    
    
 
 
   (     )   , 
 
 
   (     )   , 
    
 
62 
 
 
Conditions of selecting the high-prize tournament for both types are the same as in Case 1.1 
because on the equilibrium path both types choose the same strategies. Similarly, individual 
rationality conditions will be same as in Case 1.1 because both types select the high-prize 
tournament and exert   . 
Case 1.3: Types separate for effort levels in the low-prize and high-prize tournaments:  
  
      
      
      
   . 
To have both types exert effort levels with the above probabilities, the following constraint 
should hold on the prize:  
 
 
 
To have both types select the high-prize tournament with the strategies above, the following 
constraint should hold on the prize:  
To have both types follow the above strategies and gain a positive expected utility, the following 
constraint should hold on the prize:  
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Case 1.4: Types pool for effort level    in the low-prize tournament; types pool for effort level    
in the high-prize tournament: 
  
      
      
      
   . 
To have both types exert effort levels with the above probabilities, the following constraint 
should hold on the prize:  
 
 
 
Conditions for selecting the high-prize tournament for both types are the same as in Case 1.1 
because on the equilibrium path both types choose the same strategies. For a similar reason, 
individual rationality conditions will be same as in Case 1.1. 
Case 1.5: Types pool for effort level    in the low-prize tournament; types separate for effort 
level in the high-prize tournament:  
  
      
      
      
   . 
To have both types exert effort levels with the above probabilities, the following constraint 
should hold on the prize:  
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Conditions for selecting the high-prize tournament for both types are the same as in Case 1.3 
because on the equilibrium path both types choose the same strategies. For a similar reason, 
individual rationality conditions will be same as in Case 1.3. 
Case 1.6: Types pool for effort level    in the low-prize and high-prize tournaments: 
  
      
      
      
   . 
To have both types exert effort levels with the above probabilities, the following constraint 
should hold on the prize:  
 
 
To have both types select the high-prize tournament with the strategies above after the 
tournament choice, the following constraint should hold on the prize:  
To have both types follow the above strategies and gain a positive expected utility, the following 
constraint should hold on the prize:  
 
 
 
Case 2: Separating equilibrium: Good types enter the high-prize tournament; bad types 
enter the low-prize tournament,      and     . 
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Case 2.1: Both types pool for effort level    in both tournaments: 
  
      
      
      
   . 
For types’ optimal effort choice, the same conditions (for effort levels) as in Case 1.1 should be 
satisfied. To have good types participate in the high-prize tournament and bad types participate in 
the low-prize tournament, the following conditions should hold: 
There is no equilibrium like this because bad types always want to participate in the high-prize 
tournament with these equilibrium effort choices. 
Case 2.2: Types separate for effort levels in the low-prize tournament; both types pool for effort 
level    in the high-prize tournament: 
  
      
      
      
   . 
For types’ optimal effort choice, the same conditions (for effort levels) as in Case 1.2 should be 
satisfied. To have types separate into the tournaments, the following conditions should hold: 
 
 
 
To have both types follow the above strategies and gain a positive expected utility, the following 
conditions should hold: 
  
 
 
   (     )  
 
 
     (     )   , 
  
 
 
   (     )  
 
 
     (     )   . 
    
    
 
 
 
     (     )    
 
 
  , 
 
 
     (     )        (     )   . 
    
    
 
66 
 
 
 
 
Case 2.3: Types separate for effort levels in the low-prize tournament; types separate for effort 
levels in the high-prize tournament: 
  
      
      
      
   . 
The same conditions (for effort levels) as in Case 1.3 should be satisfied for the effort levels here. 
To have types separate into the tournaments, the following conditions should hold: 
Individual rationality conditions for both types in equilibrium satisfy the conditions in Case 2.2 
because types self-select into the tournaments; on the equilibrium path types exert the same effort 
levels in the tournaments. 
Case 2.4: Types pool for effort level    in the low-prize tournament; types pool for effort level    
in the high-prize tournament: 
  
      
      
      
   . 
The same conditions (for effort levels) as in Case 1.4 should be satisfied for the effort levels here. 
To have types separate into the tournaments, and have both types follow the above strategies and 
gain a positive expected utility, the following conditions should hold: 
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Case 2.5: Types pool for effort level    in the low-prize tournament; types separate for effort 
level in the high-prize tournament: 
  
      
      
      
   . 
The same conditions (for effort levels) as in Case 1.5 should be satisfied for the effort levels here. 
To have types separate into the tournaments, and have both types follow the above strategies and 
gain a positive expected utility, the following conditions should hold: 
Case 2.6: Types pool for effort level    in the low-prize tournament; types pool for effort level    
in the high-prize tournament.  
  
      
      
      
   . 
The same conditions (for effort levels) as in Case 1.6 should be satisfied for the effort levels here. 
To have types separate into the tournaments, the following conditions should hold: 
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There is no equilibrium like this because bad types always want to participate in the high-prize 
tournament with these equilibrium effort choices. 
Corollary: According to the incentive compatibility conditions for effort levels and tournament 
selection, the prize ratio should be set in the following interval 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 to guarantee types self-
select into the different tournaments. 
Case 3: Semi-pooling equilibrium: Good types enter the high-prize tournament,     , 
and bad types mix between tournaments,    (   ). 
Case 3.1: Both types pool for effort level    in both tournaments: 
  
      
      
      
   . 
The same conditions as in Case 1.1 should be satisfied for the effort levels here. To have good 
types enter the high-prize tournament and bad types mix between the tournaments, and have both 
types follow the above strategies (for effort choice and tournament selection) and gain a positive 
expected utility, the following conditions should hold: 
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Case 3.2: Types separate for effort level in the low-prize tournament; both types pool for effort 
level    in the high-prize tournament: 
  
      
      
      
   . 
The same conditions as in Case 1.2 should be satisfied for the effort levels. To have high types 
enter the high-prize tournament and low types mix between the tournaments, the following 
conditions should hold: 
Individual rationality conditions will be same as in Case 3.1; when bad types are in the high-prize 
tournament they still exert   . 
Case 3.3: Types separate for effort levels in the low-prize tournament; types separate for effort 
levels in the high-prize tournament:  
  
      
      
      
   . 
The same conditions as in Case 1.3 should be satisfied for the effort levels here. To have good 
types enter the high-prize tournament and bad types to mix between the tournaments, and have 
both types follow the above strategies (for effort choice and tournament selection) and gain a 
positive expected utility, the following conditions should hold: 
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Case 3.4: Types pool for effort level    in the low-prize tournament; types pool for effort level    
in the high-prize tournament.  
  
      
      
      
   . 
The same conditions as in Case 1.4 should be satisfied for the effort levels here. To have good 
types enter the high-prize tournament and bad types mix between the tournaments, and have both 
types follow the above strategies (for effort choice and tournament selection) and gain a positive 
expected utility the following inequalities should hold. 
 
Case 3.5: Types pool for effort level    in the low-prize tournament; types separate for effort 
level in the high-prize tournament:  
  
      
      
      
   . 
The same conditions as in Case 1.5 should be satisfied for the effort levels here. To have good 
types enter the high-prize tournament and bad types mix between the tournaments, and have both 
types follow the above strategies (for effort choice and tournament selection) and gain a positive 
expected utility, the following conditions should hold: 
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Case 3.6: Types pool for effort level    in the low-prize and high-prize tournaments:  
  
      
      
      
   . 
The same conditions as in Case 1.6 should be satisfied for the effort levels. To have good types 
enter the high-prize tournament and bad types to mix between the tournaments, and have both 
types follow the above strategies (for effort choice and tournament selection) and gain a positive 
expected utility, the following conditions should hold: 
Case 4: Good types enter the low-prize tournament; bad types enter the high-prize 
tournament,     , and     . 
Case 4.1: Both types pool for effort level    in both tournaments: 
  
      
      
      
   . 
The same conditions as in Case 1.1 should be satisfied for the effort levels here. The following 
conditions should hold to have good types choose the low-prize tournament and bad types choose 
the high-prize tournament: 
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However, this cannot hold because      ; good types want to enter the high-prize 
tournament as well. 
Case 4.2: Types separate for effort level in the low-prize tournament; types pool for effort level 
   in the high-prize tournament: 
  
      
      
      
   . 
The same conditions as in Case 1.2 should be satisfied for the effort levels here. The following 
conditions should hold to have good types choose the low-prize tournament and bad types choose 
the high-prize tournament: 
However, this cannot hold because      ; good types want to enter the high-prize 
tournament as well. 
Case 4.3: Types separate for effort level in the low-prize and high-prize tournaments: 
  
      
      
      
   . 
The same conditions as in Case 1.3 should be satisfied for the effort levels here. The following 
conditions should hold to have good types choose the low-prize tournament and bad types choose 
the high-prize tournament: 
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However, this cannot hold because      ; good types want to enter the high-prize 
tournament as well. 
Case 4.4: Types pool for effort level    in the low-prize tournament; types pool for effort level    
in the high-prize tournament:  
  
      
      
      
   . 
The same conditions as in Case 1.4 should be satisfied for the effort levels here. The following 
conditions should hold to have good types choose the low-prize tournament and bad types choose 
the high-prize tournament: 
However, these conditions cannot hold together because if bad types enter the high-prize 
tournament, good types should also enter because      . 
Case 4.5: Types pool for effort level    in the low-prize tournament; types separate for effort 
level in the high-prize tournament.  
  
      
      
      
   . 
The same conditions as in Case 1.5 should be satisfied for the effort levels here. The following 
conditions should hold to have good types choose the low-prize tournament and bad types choose 
the high-prize tournament: 
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However, high types’ incentive compatibility condition in the tournament choice contradicts with 
their incentive compatibility condition in the effort choice.  
Case 4.6: Types pool for effort level    in the low-prize and high-prize tournaments: 
  
      
      
      
   . 
The same conditions as in Case 1.6 should be satisfied for the effort levels here. The following 
conditions should hold to have good types choose the low-prize tournament and bad types choose 
the high-prize tournament: 
Contradiction, no equilibrium exists with these strategies for tournament selection and effort 
choices. 
Case 5: Both types participate in the low-prize tournament,     , and     . 
Case 5.1: Both types pool for effort level    in both tournaments: 
  
      
      
      
   . 
The same conditions as in Case 1.1 should be satisfied for the effort levels here. The following 
conditions should hold to have both types choose the low-prize tournament: 
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However, this cannot hold because                      . 
Case 5.2: Types separate for effort level in the low-prize tournament; types pool for effort level 
   in the high-prize tournament: 
  
      
      
      
   . 
The same conditions as in Case 1.2 should be satisfied for the effort levels here. The following 
conditions should hold to have both types choose the low-prize tournament: 
However, this cannot hold because        
Case 5.3: Types separate for effort level in the low-prize and high-prize tournaments: 
  
      
      
      
   . 
The same conditions as in Case 1.3 should be satisfied for the effort levels here. The following 
conditions should hold to have both types choose the low-prize tournament: 
However, this cannot hold because        
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Case 5.4: Types pool for effort level    in the low-prize tournament; types pool for effort level    
in the high-prize tournament:  
  
      
      
      
   . 
The same conditions as in Case 1.4 should be satisfied for the effort levels here. The following 
conditions should hold to have both types choose the low-prize tournament: 
However, this cannot hold because        
Case 5.5: Types pool for effort level    in the low-prize tournament; types separate for effort 
level in the high-prize tournament.  
  
      
      
      
   . 
The same conditions as in Case 1.5 should be satisfied for the effort levels here. The following 
conditions should hold to have both types choose the low-prize tournament: 
However, this cannot hold because        
Case 5.6: Types pool for effort level    in the low-prize and high-prize tournaments: 
  
      
      
      
   . 
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The same conditions as in Case 1.5 should be satisfied for the effort levels here. The following 
conditions should hold to have both types choose the low-prize tournament: 
However, this cannot hold because        
3.9 Appendix 3: Proof of Proposition 1 
Suppose, bad types choose    when        in the single-prize tournament. So, the incentive 
compatibility condition for bad types is satisfied if the following condition holds: 
 
 
   (     )    . 
The individual rationality condition for bad types is satisfied when they exert    if the following 
condition holds: 
   (
 
 
     )     (     )   , 
which implies that the principal needs to set K such that  
   (     )         . 
This contradicts with the initial condition for the effort levels. Hence, if       , bad types exert 
   in the tournament as well. 
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3.10 Appendix 4:  
  
 High-Prize Tournament Low-Prize Tournament 
 
High Prize 
Cost 
Difference Types               
 Large Good 85 (100) 15 (0) 65 (100) 35 (0) 
 Large Bad 30 (0) 70 (100) 14 (0) 86 (100) 
Optimal Small Good 93 (100) 7 (0) 64 (100) 36 (0) 
 Small Bad 77 (100) 23 (0) 38 (0) 62 (100) 
 Large Good 97 (100) 3 (0) 46 (100) 54 (0) 
Above 
Optimal 
Large Bad 68 (0) 32 (100) 18 (0) 82 (100) 
 Small Good 98 (100) 2 (0) 40 (100) 60 (0) 
 Small Bad 94 (100) 6 (0) 33 (0) 67 (100) 
Table 3.6: Observed effort percentages (%) in the tournaments 
(Equilibrium percentages are in parentheses) 
 
High Prize Optimal Above Optimal 
Cost Difference Large Small Large Small 
 Types Good Bad  Good    Bad  Good Bad    Good   Bad 
 
High-Prize 
Tournament 
(HT) 
High 
Effort 
10.41** 
(9.15)** 
-4.52 
(-5.25) 
8.05** 
(9.15)** 
5.43** 
(6.75)** 
17.99** 
(19.7)** 
0.95 
(2) 
12.60** 
(12.81)** 
9.47** 
(9.74)** 
Low 
Effort 
   8.41 
(7.3) 
0.61** 
(-0.5)** 
5.83 
(7.3) 
4.53 
(6) 
9.45 
(10.55) 
  1.65** 
 (2.75)** 
2.42 
(2.99) 
1.12 
(1.69) 
Payoff Difference due to 
Efforts in HT 
2.00 
  (1.85) 
-5.13 
(-4.75) 
2.22 
(1.85) 
0.90 
(0.75) 
8.54 
(9.15) 
-0.70 
(-0.75) 
10.19 
(9.82) 
8.35 
(8.05) 
 
Low-Prize 
Tournament 
(LT) 
High 
Effort 
7.62* 
(8.4)* 
-6.25 
(-6) 
7.56* 
(8.4)* 
5.38 
(6) 
9.51* 
(10.6)* 
-2.25 
(-0.5) 
10.86* 
(11.08)* 
9.15 
(9.36) 
Low 
Effort 
    7.53 
(8.3) 
-0.27* 
(0.5)* 
7.48 
(8.3) 
6.18* 
(7)* 
9.45 
(10.55) 
1.65* 
(2.75)* 
10.78 
(11.05) 
9.48* 
(9.74)* 
Payoff Difference due to 
Efforts in LT 
0.09 
(0.1) 
-5.98 
(-6.5) 
0.08 
(0.1) 
-0.80 
(-1) 
0.06 
(0.05) 
-3.90 
(-3.25) 
0.07 
(0.03) 
-0.33 
(-0.38) 
Payoff Difference 
between the 
tournaments (HT-LT) 
2.79 
  (0.75) 
-0.88 
(-1) 
0.26 
(0.75) 
0.98 
(-0.25) 
8.48 
(9.1) 
0.00 
(0) 
1.75 
(1.73) 
-0.01 
(0) 
Table 3.7: Expected payoffs with experimental distributions 
(Equilibrium predictions in parentheses) 
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3.11 Appendix 5: Experimental Instructions for the Single Prize 
Tournaments 
80 
 
81 
 
82 
 
83 
 
84 
 
85 
 
86 
 
 
  
87 
 
3.12 Appendix 6: Experimental Instructions for the Parallel 
Tournaments  
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3.13 Appendix 7: Treatment Orders in the Single-Prize and Parallel 
Tournaments  
Periods 
1-10 
OL BOL OS BOL BOL OS BOL OL OS BOL 
Periods 
11-20 
OL BOL BOL OL BOL OS OL BOL OS BOL 
Periods 
21-30 
BOL OS BOL OL OS BOL OL BOL BOL OL 
Periods 
31-40 
BOL OS OL BOL OS BOL BOL OS BOL OL 
BOL: Below-optimal prize 
Large cost-difference 
OL: Optimal prize 
Large cost-difference 
OS: Optimal prize 
Small cost-difference 
Table 3-8: Treatment Orders in the Single-Prize Tournaments 
 
Periods 
1-10 
OL OS AOS AOL AOL AOS OS OL AOS AOL 
Periods 
11-20 
OL OS OS OL AOL AOS OL OS AOS AOL 
Periods 
21-30 
AOL AOS OS OL AOS AOL OL OS OS OL 
Periods 
31-40 
AOL AOS OL OS AOS AOL AOL AOS OS OL 
AOL: Above-Optimal Prize 
Large cost-difference 
AOS: Above-Optimal Prize 
Small cost-difference 
OL: Optimal Prize 
Large cost-difference 
OL: Optimal Prize 
Small cost-difference 
Table 3-9: Treatment Orders in the Parallel Tournament  
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Chapter 4:  
Decentralized Matching Market with 
Time Frictions57  
4.1 Introduction   
There are many real-life examples in which two-sided matching markets are centralized, such as 
the medical residency match, school allocations in New York City and Boston, and so on. In 
these markets, an agent from each side of the market submits a rank-ordered preference list to a 
central clearinghouse, which then produces a matching. The literature has mostly focused on 
centralized matching markets;
58
 however, in markets such as college admissions in the US, the 
market for law clerks, junior economists, etc., matching proceeds in a decentralized manner. This 
paper studies a two-period decentralized game in which agents care about matching with their 
partners sooner (e.g., an unemployed person wants to find a job as quickly as possible and a firm 
looks for an employee for a particular job with some urgency). I study whether this game reaches 
a stable matching
59
 as an equilibrium, and if so, whether the selected stable outcome changes for 
different levels of time discounting. 
The success of centralized matching markets (their continued use in a market) is 
associated with whether they produce a stable outcome (Roth, 1991; Niederle and Roth, 2009). 
Hence, most centralized matching mechanisms implement a stable matching. If there are multiple 
                                                     
57
 I thank Julian Romero for the simulations in this chapter. 
58
 See Niederle and Yariv (2009), Pais (2008), Haeringer and Wooders (2010) and references therein for 
exceptions. 
59
 A stable match is a pairing of workers and firms in which no firm (worker) who is matched to a worker 
(firm) prefers to be alone, and no firm and worker pair prefer to jointly deviate by matching to one another.  
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stable matchings for the reported preferences (which is quite likely for large number of market 
participants
60
), the centralized matching algorithm chooses one of them to implement. For 
example, Gale-Shapley deferred acceptance algorithm (Gale and Shapley, 1962) results in either 
the firm-optimal stable matching or the worker-optimal stable matching, depending on who 
proposes first in the algorithm. However, a decentralized game might not necessarily implement 
only one stable matching. In this paper, I identify conditions under which different stable 
matchings
61
 are selected as the outcome of a (noncooperative) decentralized game.  
I study a simple model of a decentralized matching game in a market that is composed of 
firms, workers, and their preferences (firms’ preferences are over workers and workers’ 
preferences are over firms). I assume that these preferences are strict and are represented by 
cardinal utilities. Each firm can hire at most one worker and each worker can work for at most 
one firm. This one-to-one matching process in the market is modeled as an extensive form game 
where firms, named by index numbers,
62
 sequentially propose to workers according to the 
ordering given by their index numbers. Those who receive a proposal immediately respond by 
accepting or rejecting the offer. If a worker gets a better offer in the same period, he can accept it 
even if he accepted another offer earlier, i.e., workers can hold offers. All agents know the others’ 
preferences and observe all past realized actions. I assume that all firms (workers) prefer being 
matched with a worker (firm) to remaining unmatched. There is no commitment between the 
firms and workers; firms can propose to another worker in the second period even if they were 
matched with a worker in the first period or workers can accept another offer even if they 
accepted an offer earlier. Each firm can make only one offer per period. If all agents get matched 
in the first period, the game ends. 
                                                     
60
 Pittel (1989) shows that the number of stable matchings tends to increase as the number of market 
participants increases. 
61
 I consider environments with multiple stable matchings. 
62
 For instance, the name of a firm with the index number 1 is   . 
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When there is at least one firm and one worker that did not get matched in the first period 
a similar procedure occurs in the second period. In this case, if a firm gets rejected in the first 
period, it cannot make a proposal to the same worker again in the second period. All agents (even 
if they got matched in the first period) stay in the market until the game ends. Agents’ utilities are 
affected by which period and whom they get matched with in each period. All agents get a period 
utility from their first-period matches and a discounted lifetime utility from their second-period 
matches. Firms and workers share a common discount factor, and receive their match utilities at 
the end of each period.  
Under complete information, for specific preference profiles
63
 I find that the subgame 
perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) of the game coincides with a stable matching for any time 
discount, either the firm optimal or the worker-optimal stable matching. Which stable matching 
coincides with the SPNE depends on the time discount.  
When the time discount is low, I find that the unique SPNE outcome of the game yields 
the firm-optimal stable matching. This is because since firms know that workers will accept any 
offer in the first period
64
 they will make offers to the best-achievable workers for them, i.e., to 
their firm-optimal matches. When the time discount is sufficiently high, I find that the SPNE 
outcome of the game yields the firm-optimal stable matching. This is because with a high time 
discount, one of the firms may profit delaying its matching to the second period.
65
 By knowing 
the workers will accept any proposal in the last period, all firms propose to the best possible 
matches for them, to their firm-optimal matches, in that period.  
                                                     
63
 In these preference profiles, there is no conflict of interest for the first-ranked workers among the firms 
and there is no conflict of interest for the first-ranked firms among the workers. The threshold for a worker 
to reject an offer is smaller then the threshold of a firm to delay the matching to the second period.  
64
 Even if a rejection of an offer in the first period brings the best-achievable match to a worker in the 
second period, it is not profitable for the worker to reject any offer for a low time discount. 
65
 The model does not allow firms to just wait for the second period without making an offer.  
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When the time discount is intermediate the unique SPNE outcome of the game yields a 
worker-optimal stable matching. In this case, firms know that they will be rejected if they make 
offers to their firm-optimal stable matches in the first period. Moreover, it is not profitable for any 
firm to delay its matching to the second period and propose to its favorite worker then (unlike in 
the case of a very large time discount). According to the preference profiles that I consider in this 
paper, a firm ranks its match under firm-optimal stable matching and worker-optimal stable 
matching consecutively. Hence, for intermediate discount factors, firms immediately make offers 
to their worker-optimal stable matches in the first period and get accepted. 
In the literature, there are only a few papers on decentralized matching markets (Roth and 
Xing, 1997; Blum et al., 1997; Alcalde et al., 1998; Pais, 2008; Diamantoudi et al., 2006; 
Niederle and Yariv, 2009; and Haeringer and Wooders, 2010). Among those studies, my work is 
most related to the last two. 
Niederle and Yariv (2009) show that when agents have aligned preferences and the time 
discount is high enough, the unique stable matching outcome coincides with the Bayesian Nash 
equilibrium outcome of the game with iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies. They 
work with aligned preferences to guarantee a unique stable matching and hence to eliminate 
coordination problems due to multiple stable matchings. Here, I also study a decentralized game 
with time discounting. In contrast, I consider preference profiles that guarantee multiple stable 
matching. Since I work on a sequential game with perfect information in this paper, I could 
overcome problems of coordination on specific stable matches for some preference profiles.  
Haeringer and Wooders (2010) consider the case of complete information and restrict 
firms’ strategies such that they cannot make offers to workers who had rejected them previously, 
as in our case. In their game, firms can only make exploding offers, i.e., offers must be accepted 
or rejected right away and the decisions are irreversible. The game ends when all firms exit the 
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market. The authors show that there is a unique SPNE that coincides with the worker-optimal 
matching. In my model, agents can hold offers, i.e., decisions are reversible. Additionally, my 
game has two periods and assumes a time discount. I show that, depending on the time discount 
and preference profile, the SPNE coincides with either the firm-optimal or worker-optimal stable 
matching. 
Last, Echenique and Yariv (2012) study a decentralized matching market in an 
experimental environment. Their experiment allows nonbinding offers under complete 
information without friction. According to their experimental results, most outcomes coincide 
with stable matchings; which stable matching gets selected depends on the cardinal representation 
of ordinal preferences. In contrast, I consider time frictions. Similar to their result, I find that the 
selected stable matching (with preferences that allow multiple stable matchings) depends on the 
time discount and the cardinal utility representation of the firm-optimal and worker-optimal stable 
matches. 
This chapter is organized as follows: section 2 provides the marriage model and section 3 
describes the decentralized matching game. Section 4, 5, and 6 present the results. Section 7 
discusses the results and concludes. 
4.2 The Marriage Model 
I consider a finite set of workers   {            } and a finite set of firms 
  {            }  where the cardinality of these sets is the same, i.e., | |  | |     Each 
worker     has a strict, complete, transitive, and asymmetric preference relation    over 
  { }  Similarly, each firm     has a strict, complete, transitive, and asymmetric preference 
relation    over   { }  The preferences of firms and workers,        , are represented by 
the utility function   (  ( )   ( ))  where the first component represents the utility of a firm 
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from being matched with a worker or itself (unmatched), i.e.,   ( )   { }     and the 
second component represents the utility of a worker from being matched with a firm or himself, 
i.e.,   ( )   { }   . The utility representation of firms and workers is common knowledge 
to all agents. The final utility obtained by a worker (or a firm) from the matching process depends 
on the matches that they have in each period and on the time discount factor,     (   )   Each 
(firm’s) worker’s utility from the game is the sums of the first period match utility and the 
discounted second period match utility for their remaining lives. 
I assume that match utilities are strictly positive, i.e.,   ( )    for all     and 
  ( )    for all    . The utilities of unmatched firms and workers are normalized to 0 and 
represented as   ( )    and   ( )   , respectively. Hence, all agents prefer being matched 
to being unmatched, for all      ( )    ( )     and for all       ( )    ( )   .  
For fixed sets of firms   and workers , a market is denoted by (     )  
A match is a function  :        , such that for all      ( )    { }, and for 
all    ,  ( )    { }. Moreover, the matching function is one-to-one; i.e., if (   )    
 , then  ( )    if and only if  ( )   . A blocking pair in a match is formed if there exists a 
pair (   )      , where   and   would be happier if they were matched to each other than 
they are with their current matches under  ; i.e.,   ( )    ( ( )) and   ( )    ( ( ))  In 
this case, a pair (   )      blocks matching. A match is stable if it does not have any 
blocking pairs. The most preferred stable matching by firms (workers), the firm-optimal (worker-
optimal) stable matching    (  ) is the least preferred stable matching by workers (firms).  
4.3 The Decentralized Game 
For a given market (     ), I consider the following two-period decentralized matching game. 
The market is common knowledge to all agents and all agents are unmatched at the beginning of 
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the game.
66
 In both periods (t = 1, 2) firms are given the opportunity to make offers according to 
their index numbers and workers who get offers immediately respond to them. There are    
stages in a period, where    is the total number of firms and workers in the market. In the first 
stage of the first period, the firm indexed by 1,   , proposes to a worker.
67
 In the second stage, the 
worker receiving the offer, immediately replies to the firm either by accepting or rejecting it, or 
she does nothing. In the third stage, by observing   ’s offer to a worker and the worker’s 
response, the firm indexed by 2,   , makes an offer to a worker (it can be to any worker in the 
market). In the fourth stage, the worker, who receives that offer, responds and so on. The game 
continues by giving firms the opportunity to make offers, according to their index numbers. The 
first period ends when all firms in the market make their offers to workers and all workers who 
have received an offer have replied (either accepted or rejected the offers). If all firms and 
workers are matched in the first period the game ends, otherwise the second period starts. 
All matched and unmatched agents stay in the market for the second period and the 
second period proceeds similarly. In particular, firms make offers in the order of their indices to 
workers who did not reject them in the first period after observing the first period’s matches, 
proposals, and rejections/acceptances. Then workers who obtain the offers reply back 
immediately by observing all past realized actions. Matchings are not binding for both parties; 
any worker or firm can break up with his (its) match at any time. For each period, an agent 
receives utility from the match she has at the end of a period. An agent receives his match utility 
from the first period and a discounted lifetime utility from the second period.   
Formally, the described extensive form decentralized matching game is an array   
(        (  
 )   
 ) where   is the set of all nonterminal histories (stage) with a generic 
element    ,   is the strategy space,   ∏         where    ∏   
 
    for every     
                                                     
66
 The initial matching for the first period is taken as empty, but the initial matching for the second period is 
taken as the matching that is formed in the first period. 
67
 This order affects the game outcome for some preference profiles. 
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  and (  
 )   
  is the utility of each agent       from his matches in the first and second 
periods as a result of his strategy. Let    ∏   
 
      be the set of strategies available to player 
  after observing the history  . After observing history   only one of the players is active at 
history (stage)    , i.e., due to the structure of the game      
 . For instance, in the first stage 
of the first period, the firm    proposes to a worker (   
 ) after observing initial history  ; in the 
second stage the proposed worker (   where        ) accepts or rejects the offer (   
 ); in the 
third stage, the firm    proposes to a worker (   
 ) after observing    (     
     
 ) and so on.  In 
particular, the history at stage   is an ordered collection of strategies before stage  , 
(           )    . If      (     ) then history      proceeds history   . If there is no 
history following some    , it is called a terminal history. The set of all terminal histories is 
denoted by    For every       there is a subgame  ( )  (     ( )  ( ) (  
 )   
 ) 
where   is the initial history,  ( )  {    |             } and  ( )  ∏   
 
    ( ) . Given 
history   and the strategy   there are two resulting matching outcomes (one for each period), 
respectively     |   for the first period match and     |   for the second period match. A player 
      obtains the utility,   , by playing    as a strategy when the initial history is   (in this 
case the resulting matchings are      |   and  
    |  ) and time discount   (   ): 
  (  | )    ( 
    |   )  
 
   
  ( 
    |  ). 
For each period, agents receive utilities from the matches that they have at the end of a 
period. They get their match utility from the first period and discounted lifetime match utility 
from the second period.
68
  
                                                     
68
 The first period match can be thought as a date, in men-women matching or temporary firm-worker 
matching etc. For most agents there is a trial-error period until they find their final (life time) matches.  
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The equilibrium concept that I consider in this paper is the subgame perfect Nash 
equilibrium. A strategy profile    is a SPNE if there is no strategy   such that   (      | )  
  (  
     | ) for each player      , and for each history    .  
4.4 Preferences 
I focus on a specific class of preference profiles that are as follows for firms and workers: 
                    (     ) for all   {       } 
                    (     ) for all   {       } 
There are two stable matchings, the firm-optimal stable matching   (  )     and the worker-
optimal stable matching   (  )      (     ). According to these preference profiles, there is 
no conflict of interest among firms, there is no conflict of interest among workers but there is a 
conflict of interest between firms and workers.69   
Proposition 1: The decentralized matching game with the described market has a 
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium that coincides with one of the stable matches. 
Proof: There are three cases in here. First, if the time discount is small, none of the 
workers finds profitable to reject any offer. By knowing that firms sequentially propose to the 
best achievable workers for themselves that are their firm-optimal stable matches. Hence with the 
described preferences, all firms propose to their firm-optimal stable matches (who are ranked first 
by the firms) and get accepted in the first period. 
                                                     
69
 The statements of this paper can be extended for the preference profiles in which at least one of the 
workers finds profitable to reject a proposal (i.e. ranks his firm-optimal match really lower than his worker-
optimal stable match) but all firms rank their worker-optimal stable matches as the second (just after their 
firm-optimal matches).  
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Second, if the time discount is larger, firms may want to delay their matchings to the 
second period and propose to the best achievable worker for themselves by then. Again since it is 
the last period, all workers will accept the offers. By knowing that all firms propose to their firm-
optimal stable matches in the second period. In the first period, all firms know that if they 
propose to their first ranked worker in their lists, they will be rejected. Hence, except the last firm 
(it is disadvantageous to propose the last) all firms propose to their worker-optimal stable matches 
in the first period. The last firm observes others’ offers and responses then it proposes to a worker 
who will reject him for sure in the first period. Then all firms propose to their firm-optimal 
matches in the second period.  
Third, if the time discount is intermediate, none of the firms finds profitable to be 
unmatched in the first period and to delay its matching to the second period. Further, if they 
propose to their firm-optimal stable matches in the first period, their proposals will be rejected. 
Hence, they propose to the next best achievable workers, their worker-optimal stable matches and 
get accepted in the first period.  
4.5 Small Time Discount 
I analyze the game outcome for three groups of time discounts. First, suppose the time discount is 
so small (hence, the discounted gain from the second period is small) that none of the workers 
profits from being unmatched in the first period but being matched with their worker-optimal 
matches in the second period. In this case, all workers accept any offer in the first period. The 
following proposition summarizes the result in this condition. 
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Proposition 2: When        
   ( 
 (  ))
    ( 
 (  ))
 for all      {          }  the unique 
SPNE of the decentralized matching game for the described market coincides with the firm-
optimal stable matching.
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Proof: Since   is so small, a worker    would accept his first period offer immediately 
even if the rejection of a first period’s offer brings him his worker-optimal stable match in the 
second period, (  
 
   
)     ( 
 (  ))  
 
   
    ( 
 (  )). As a result, all firms make 
offers to their firm optimal stable matches and get accepted in the first period. 
Table 4.1 in the Appendix summarizes the frequency of game outcomes (for a particular time 
discount) coinciding with stable or unstable matchings for a market with three firms and three 
workers. This frequency is taken over all preferences that guarantee multiple stable matchings for 
this market. As one can see from that Table 4.1, for small   the SPNE corresponds to the firm-
optimal stable matching in most preference profiles (with a frequency of %99.7). 
4.6 Intermediate Time Discounts 
Second, I analyze the game outcome for intermediate time discounts. The lower bound for the 
time discount is determined by a worker’s willingness to reject an offer (he may reject if he 
prefers being unmatched in the first period and being matched with a better firm in the second 
period to being matched with his firm-optimal stable match for the rest of his life). The upper 
bound for the time discount is determined by a firm’s willingness to delay the matching to the 
second period (it may prefer delaying its matching, if the firm expects its favorite worker to reject 
it in the first period). The following proposition summarizes the result with intermediate time 
discount. 
                                                     
70
 If the game were simultaneous, this theorem would satisfy for all preferences. In this case, the best a firm 
would achieve its firm-optimal match. 
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Proposition 3: When      {
   ( 
 (  ))
    ( 
  (  ))
}         {
   ( 
 (  ))
   ( 
 (  ))
} for all 
     {       }  and      {       } the unique SPNE of the decentralized matching game for the 
described market coincides with the worker-optimal stable matching.
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Proof:  If   
  
{
   ( 
 (  ))
    ( 
  (  ))
}    it means that there exists one worker who thinks that it 
is better for him not to accept an offer from his firm-optimal stable match in the first period but to 
accept an offer from his worker-optimal stable match in the second period. Hence all firms know 
that when they make offers to their firm-optimal matches, one of the workers can reject such an 
offer and lead its matching to the second period. By rejecting the offer from his firm-optimal 
match, this worker guarantees an offer from a better firm because rejected firms cannot propose 
to the same worker in the second period (their firm-optimal matches) and the second-best workers 
for the firms are their matches under    by construction. In particular, if all workers accept the 
offers from their firm-optimal matches, the game will end and the resulting match will be the 
firm-optimal stable match. When a worker rejects the offer from his firm-optimal match he can be 
unmatched in the first period but he guarantees an offer from his worker-optimal match in the 
second period. Hence, if 
 
   
    ( 
 (  ))  
 
   
   ( 
 (  )), then it is profitable to reject 
the offer and get an offer from his worker-optimal stable match in the second period.  
From the proposer side, firms know that if they make offers to their firm-optimal matches 
and get rejected in the first period, they cannot make offer(s) to the same worker(s) in the second 
period. Instead, in order to obtain their firm-optimal matches in the second period, one of the 
firms may prefer to make an offer to the same worker with another firm and to be unmatched 
                                                     
71
The likelihood of having the preferences leading to the outcome in Proposition 3, among the preferences 
that guarantee multiple-stable matching in a 3x3 market is at most 0.23. If this condition does not hold, i.e., 
     {
   
(  (  ))
   
(  (  ))
}     
  
{
   ( 
 (  ))
    ( 
  (  ))
} for all      {       } and      {       } then the SPNE 
outcome would coincide with firm-optimal stable match for all time discount. 
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(i.e., to make an offer to a worker who is preferred less than its worker-optimal match) in the first 
period. However, since        {
   ( 
 (  ))
   ( 
 (  ))
} for all firms, none of the firms has an incentive 
to do so. If   is in the specified interval, all firms will propose to their matches under    and get 
accepted in the first period.  
Example 2 (SPNE for intermediate time discounts): Consider a market with three 
firms   {        }, three workers   {        }, and the following preference profiles. 
Suppose the utilities corresponding to these preference profiles are such that all firms (workers) 
get 9 as utility from their first-ranked workers (firms), 6 from their second-ranked workers 
(firms), and 3 from their last-ranked workers (firms). 
                  
〈  〉 〈  〉 〈  〉                
                        
         〈  〉 〈  〉 〈  〉 
Under these preferences, there are two stable matchings: in one stable matching (firm-
optimal one, marked by 〈 〉),   ,   , and    are matched with   ,   , and   , respectively; in the 
second stable matching (worker-optimal one, marked by    ),   ,   , and    are matched with   , 
  , and   respectively.  
If     
  
{
   ( 
 (  ))
    ( 
  (  ))
}  
 
 
   
 
 
      {
   ( 
 (  ))
   ( 
 (  ))
},    will make an offer to   ; 
   will make an offer to   ;    will make an offer to    and all offers will be accepted in the first 
period in the SPNE. Suppose that    made an offer to   (its firm-optimal match), then    would 
reject it and    would be unmatched in the first period. In the second period, it cannot offer to    
(because it got rejected in the first period) again, hence it can make an offer to its second-best 
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worker (worker-optimal match) in the second period. Similar situations may occur for the other 
firms too.  
One of the firms can make an offer to a worker who is less preferred than its worker-optimal 
match to be unmatched (at worst scenario) in the first period and makes an offer to its firm-
optimal match in the second period (to delay the matching). However, since   
 
 
, none of the 
firms has an incentive to delay its match to the second period. Hence, in equilibrium all firms 
make offers to their worker-optimal matches and all workers accept these offers in the first 
period. 
4.7 Large Time Discounts 
Last, I analyze the game outcome for large time discounts. The lower bound for the time discount 
is determined by a firm’s willingness to delay the matching to the second period. For larger time 
discounts firms may prefer being matched with their favorite one in the second period to being 
matched with a less preferred worker for the rest of their lives in the first period. The following 
proposition summarizes the result in this condition.  
Proposition 4: When        {
   ( 
 (  ))
   ( 
 (  ))
} for all      {       } the unique SPNE of 
the decentralized matching game for the described market coincides with the firm-optimal stable 
matching. 
Proof:  If        
   ( 
 (  ))
   ( 
 (  ))
              {       } then all firms have an incentive to 
delay the game to the second period and to make offers to their firm-optimal matches in the 
second period.  
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First suppose, one of the firms makes an offer to its firm-optimal match in the first 
period, then it is certain that it will be rejected (due to first part of Proposition 3) and furthermore, 
it cannot make an offer to the same worker again in the second period. Now suppose, it makes an 
offer to the second-best worker (which is its match under    according to the considered 
preference profiles) in its preference list then it will get accepted immediately. If all firms make 
offers to their second-best workers they will get accepted and the game will end in the first 
period. However, any of the firms prefer to be unmatched in the first period and get matched with 
its firm-optimal match in the second period if     ( 
 (  ))     ( 
 (  ))       {       }  
Since, the firms propose sequentially and history is observable, there won’t be a coordination 
problem about the firm who will lead the delay. One of the firms will make an offer to the same 
worker with another firm and get unmatched in the first period then in the second period all firms 
will make offers to their firm-optimal matches. Particularly, in the SPNE, all firms but the last 
one will make an offer to the second-best workers in their preference lists and will be accepted 
immediately. The last firm will make an offer to a worker who also got an offer from his worker-
optimal match in the same period and hence the last firm will be rejected in the first period. An 
unmatched firm and worker pair will lead a matching in the second period where all firms will 
make offers to best workers and will be accepted (resulting in the firm-optimal stable match). 
Example 3 (SPNE for large time discounts): Consider the same market as in the 
Example 2. If   
   ( 
 (  ))
   ( 
 (  ))
       {        }, all firms prefer to be unmatched in the first period 
but to be matched with their favorite workers in the second period. Further, it is enough for one of 
them to be unmatched in the first period to delay the matching to the second period. If the game 
were simultaneous this would have led a coordination problem. In the SPNE of the example, first 
two firms can be matched with their worker-optimal matches in the first period, the last firm will 
propose to the same worker with one of the first two and will be rejected. This will lead the 
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matching to the second period. In the second period, all firms will propose to their firm-optimal 
matches and they will be accepted. 
As one can see from that Table 4.1 in Appendix, for large   the SPNE corresponds to the 
firm-optimal stable matching in most preference profiles (with a frequency over %95). 
4.8 Conclusions and Extensions 
This paper studies a (non-cooperative) decentralized matching game in an environment with two 
stable matchings. Particularly, it analyzes whether the SPNE outcome of this game coincides with 
a stable matching and if it does, whether the coinciding stable outcome changes with the time 
discount.
72
 I find that for specific preference profiles, the SPNE always coincides with a stable 
matching. Further, for small time discounts, the SPNE coincides with the firm-optimal stable 
matching. If the time discount is intermediate, so that workers do not mind matching in the 
second period whereas firms want to match in the first period, the SPNE coincides with the 
worker-optimal stable matching. Last, if the time discount is large enough, all firms prefer not to 
be matched in the first period but to be matched with their favorite worker in the second period 
the SPNE coincides with the firm-optimal stable matching.  
Some limitations of this model are the following. First, it assumes that firms propose 
according to an order.
73
 Such an ordering may lead equilibrium outcomes that are unstable for 
some preference profiles. Particularly it may give an advantage (disadvantage) to the late (early)-
moving firms. Second I assume a particular class of preferences. Third, I assume that preference 
profiles and history are observable in the game. However, it is clear that the firm offering first has 
                                                     
72
 According to Gale-Shapley proposing side always has the advantage, but in our decentralized game 
depending on the time discount and utility ratios between the firm-optimal and the woman-optimal stable 
matches, both proposing and proposed parties can have advantage.  Proposed party has an option to reject 
and obtain a better match in the last period and proposing party has option to delay an offer if it is 
profitable.  
73
 Pais (2008) explained such an order could be explained through speed of each firm’s proposing devices: 
email, phone, mail. 
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a disadvantage for some preference profiles. Hence such a firm may prefer not to tell its 
preferences truthfully. Fourth, I assume that the game ends in two periods. However, this is not 
too realistic. Although in most matching occasions, matching parties look for their lifelong 
matches for a finite period (the matches before their final matches are their trials), they may not 
be able to find exactly in two periods. Further, this search period may change from person to 
person. 
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4.9 Appendix 1: Frequency of Stable Matches as a Response to Time 
Discount 
Consider a market with three firms   {        }, three workers   {        }, and the 
utilities in which all firms (workers) get 9 from being matched with their first-ranked workers 
(firms), 6 from being matched with their second-ranked workers (firms), and 3 from being 
matched with their last-ranked workers (firms). 
 First period SPNE outcomes Second period SPNE outcomes 
        Unstable       Unstable 
0.01 0.997 0 0.003 0 0 0 
0.15 0.997 0 0.003 0 0 0 
0.33 0.997 0 0.003 0 0 0 
0.34 0.498 0.231 0.032 0.236 0 0.004 
0.4 0.498 0.231 0.032 0.236 0 0.004 
0.45 0.498 0.231 0.032 0.236 0 0.004 
0.49 0.498 0.231 0.032 0.236 0 0.004 
0.5 0.579 0.114 0.014 0.289 0 0.005 
0.51 0.173 0.101 0.003 0.699 0 0.024 
0.55 0.173 0.101 0.003 0.699 0 0.024 
0.66 0.173 0.101 0.003 0.703 0 0.02 
0.67 0.027 0 0 0.955 0 0.018 
0.7 0.027 0 0 0.955 0 0.018 
0.75 0.025 0 0 0.948 0 0.027 
0.8 0.025 0 0 0.932 0 0.043 
0.99 0.025 0 0 0.932 0 0.043 
Table 4.1: The Frequency of Game Outcomes 
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